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Copyright scholarship is largely a debate about the tension 
between owners and users. Complaints have been legion that 
copyright law privileges owners with entitlements incompatible with 
the nature of the creative act. These complaints have been directed 
against the hegemony of economic justifications over copyright law 
emphasizing the utility in expanding the spectrum of the right, and 
competing social and cultural approaches that reject ideals of 
original authorship. Such arguments have been asserted by 
generations of scholars struggling to redefine copyright in order to 
afford users and the public comprehensive access rights and 
privileges, while preserving authors’ rights commensurate with their 
efforts. In their competing arguments, scholars protect only a few 
convenient aspects of the creative process. In this way they have 
propounded incomplete and misguided understandings of the creative 
process, of who takes part in its formation, and of how the value that 
results ought to be rewarded. Because copyright regulates ownership 
and dissemination of socially created properties, the wrongs in 
incomplete justifications have left many misconceptions about the 
right unchallenged. These wrongs affect copyright law’s ability to 
evolve into a law relevant to a cultural and networked life that values 
participation over singularity. 
This Article argues that scholars and the courts were unaware of a 
fundamental element defining the social reality of contemporary 
copyright and aims to remedy this lack of awareness. It articulates an 
innovative approach to copyright by arguing that works of art and 
authorship are expressions of dialogical transactions both between 
and among artists and authors, and between them and the public. 
These transactions have become a defining virtue of cultures that 
create and distribute the properties of social life through networks of 
information. Using transactions—a term familiar in economic-
oriented theories—to explain social processes is new to literature on 
intellectual property. Dialogue, as contrasted with other forms of 
speech-communications, is an advanced form of communication. It 
defines the rituals and social movements of traditional and digital 
cultures, and it features in the process of translating interhuman 
relations into the language of creative properties. These relations 
emerge from the intertextual and intervocal nature of dialogue 
between two distinct conditions: authors and others. This Article 
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argues that these conditions give dialogue its unique social stature 
and offers a definition of dialogue as an advanced form of 
communication that voids closure and finality. This Article shows how 
the failure of prevalent justifications—whether economic or social—
to treat creative works as dialogical, disturbs our expectation that 
copyright will “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts . . 
. .”1 
INTRODUCTION: TWO CONCEPTUAL WRONGS 
A. African Art, Abstract Art, and Invited Dialogues 
ew copyright fundamentals continue to divide copyright scholars. 
Disagreements over the limits to authorial rights and how to 
define them lead this divide. Such disagreements feed the tension 
between, on the one hand, cultural and social approaches to copyright, 
and, on the other, justifications that emphasize the role of the author 
as a unique creative being “with a special connection to reality,”2 and 
align the evaluation of copyright law “with the dictates of economic 
efficiency.”3 This tension has remained largely unresolved and 
continues to influence the design of laws regulating the protection of 
 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 683, 687 (2012). 
3 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (“Today it is acknowledged that analysis and 
evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within an economic 
framework that seeks to align that law with the dictates of economic efficiency.”). 
Scholars that criticize utilitarian justifications to copyright argue that these justifications 
are limited and do not address the social and cultural implications arising from ownership 
of intellectual properties. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF 
CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES xv (2010) (“The 
failure of American law to embrace a multidimensional perspective of human creativity is 
problematic on several fronts.”); ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 307 (2011) (claiming that “[t]he empty promise and ethical holes in the 
utilitarian theory of IP are just too glaring” and rejecting the prominence of utilitarian 
justifications. Building on Kant, Locke, and Rawls, Merges offers a multimodal theory of 
intellectual property rights); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM 
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 11 (2003) (defining the tension within the 
copyright system as a one between optimists and pessimists, between those who consider 
authors as exclusive owners and those who would like copyright to extend only so far as is 
necessary to incentivize authors and “treat anything more as an encroachment on the 
general freedom of everyone to write and say what they please”); Dan Hunter, Culture 
War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2005) (discussing the ways intellectual property 
discourses struggle to balance ownership and control of creative content); Madhavi 
Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006) (criticizing the lack of attention to the social 
problems that arise from ownership of cultural properties). 
F
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cultural expressions. Copyright scholars’ attempts to settle this divide 
have generated complex arguments as to how to reconcile users’ and 
the public’s comprehensive access rights and privileges while 
preserving authors’ rights commensurate with their efforts. In their 
attempts to settle these concerns, scholars have focused on only a few 
aspects of the creative process. This has given rise to incomplete and 
misguided understandings of what the creative process involves, who 
takes part in its formation, and how its results ought to be rewarded. 
The persistence of the copyright scholarly divide and the lack of a 
significant conceptual change in the way the creative process is 
understood continue to disturb our expectation that copyright laws 
will “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”4 This 
Article offers a possible conceptual change: thinking of the creative 
act as a dialogue. 
Four recent exhibitions displayed in U.S. museums and galleries 
have translated the creative act into the language of dialogue. These 
exhibitions examined the dialogic nature of artistic expression, 
providing unique insights into the nature of the creative process. They 
challenge the main misconception we nurture in copyright law—that 
although the process of original creation is social, the contribution of 
the individual author justifies his status as the sole proprietor of his 
creative expressions. The four exhibitions emphasize the multiplicity 
and interconnectedness of the creative act, the importance of 
dialogue, and the role fellow artists and users play in the development 
and realization of creative meanings. In this way, the exhibitions not 
only rendered an engaging artistic experience, but also inadvertently 
contributed to the understanding of the tension among intellectual 
property scholars with regard to the way the creative process is 
perceived and defined. In effect, the four exhibitions have created a 
meeting point between the poles of the copyright divide. 
In Conversations: African and African American Artworks in 
Dialogue, The National Museum of African Art brought together 
African and African American artworks in a visual and intellectual 
dialogue about particular crosscutting themes including human 
presence, power and politics, and music and urban culture.5 The idea 
was to place the works of African American art “in thematic dialogue 
 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
5 Conversations: African and African American Artworks in Dialogue, SMITHSONIAN: 
NAT’L MUSEUM OF AFRICAN ART, http://conversations.africa.si.edu/ (last visited Dec. 10, 
2016) [hereinafter Conversations]. The exhibition was on view at the museum from 
November 9, 2014, through January 24, 2016. 
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with African traditional works of art” in order “to explore intersecting 
ideas about history, creativity, power, identity, and artistry . . . .”6 
Two years earlier, in Artists in Dialogue, the museum invited artists 
to communicate with and create new works of art in response to one 
another.7 The museum facilitated an introduction between Sandile 
Zulu from South Africa and Henrique Oliveira from Brazil to enable 
them to exchange ideas and techniques relating to “the manipulability 
of a painting’s surface, the workings of the inner body and the 
inspirational power of elements like fire and water.”8 The museum 
noted, “Henrique Oliveira has shared his trademark woods with 
Sandile Zulu; Zulu, in turn, inspired Oliveira to work with fire for the 
first time.”9 Through the course of a year, the artists met and 
communicated intensively, and their interactions resulted in eight 
works of art reflecting “an ongoing dialogue” between artists, 
museum professionals, and the public.10 The works displayed a 
dialogic expression of distinctive styles and techniques of two artists 
united in a visual call and response. 
The social nature of art and the role of dialogue in artistic 
development were at the center of another recent exhibition at the 
Museum of Modern Art (MOMA). Inventing Abstraction: 1910−1925 
marked the centennial of Abstractionism.11 The show introduced 
viewers to the untold story of the invention of abstract art, which 
occurred during a period when young artists suppressed the use of 
recognizable imagery in their works. Painters, sculptors, musicians, 
poets, photographers, filmmakers, and choreographers ventured into 
this new territory, severing Western art’s age-old tether to legible 
 
6 Id. 
7 Artists in Dialogue 2: Sandile Zulu and Henrique Oliveira, SMITHSONIAN: NAT’L 
MUSEUM OF AFRICAN ART, http://africa.si.edu/exhibits/dialogue2/index.html (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Artists in Dialogue]. The exhibition was on view at the 
museum from February 2, 2011, through January 8, 2012. A similar theme was at the 
center of an exhibition showing at the Bates College Museum of Art, which explored the 
artistic dialogue between makers of sculpture and works on paper. Back and Forth: The 
Collaborative Works of Dawn Clements and Marc Leuthold, BATES COLL. MUSEUM OF 
ART, http://www.bates.edu/museum/exhibitions/past-exhibitions/2014-2/back-and-forth    
-the-collaborative-works-of-dawn-clements-and-marc-leuthold/ (last visited Dec. 10, 
2016). The exhibition was on view at the museum from January 16, 2015, through March 
21, 2015. 
8 Artists in Dialogue, supra note 7. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Inventing Abstraction, 1910–1925, MUSEUM OF MOD. ART, http://www.moma.org 
/visit/calendar/exhibitions/1291 (last visited Dec. 10, 2016). The exhibition was on view at 
the museum from December 23, 2012, through April 15, 2013. 
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images, harmonic structure, and rhyme. The show challenged the 
fallacy of “speaking of the invention of abstraction through stories of 
solitary protagonists . . . .”12 Abstract art is a form of dialogical 
exchange between artists and audience, with a momentum that builds 
up and accelerates, through a relay of ideas and acts among a nexus of 
players, between “those who make these artistic gestures and those 
who recognize and proclaim their significance to a broader audience. 
It was an invention with multiple first steps, multiple creators, 
multiple heralds, and multiple rationales.”13 
The exhibition confirmed that abstract art was never an invention 
in the sense of emerging from solitary acts but was a unique 
expression of a “distinctly modern interconnectedness . . . facilitating 
intellectual dialogue.”14 
The dialogic power behind the development of artistic styles was at 
heart of another recent exhibition showing at The University of 
 
12 LEAH DICKERMAN, INVENTING ABSTRACTION 1910–1925: HOW A RADICAL IDEA 
CHANGED MODERN ART 18 (2012). 
13 Id. This vision of the creative process corresponds to the theories of Roland Barthes 
and Michel Foucault. See Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT 
READER 101 (Paul Rabinow ed., Josué V. Harari trans., 1984); Roland Barthes, The Death 
of the Author, in IMAGE MUSIC TEXT 142, 148 (Stephen Heath trans., Noonday Press 
1988) (1977). Scholars have applied these arguments in intellectual property discourses. 
See, e.g., CARYS J. CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE: TOWARDS A 
RELATIONAL THEORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW (2011) [hereinafter CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, 
COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE] (applying Foucault’s theory of authorship to challenge 
the origin of the modern author as a sole creator); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of 
Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 
69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991) (showing how intellectual products result from social 
dialogue); Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 1, 9 (Martha 
Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (discussing the social origin of authorship); Lior 
Zemer, The Copyright Moment, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99 (2006) (rejecting romantic 
views of authorship and arguing that a copyrighted work is created when the author 
assembles jointly owned properties with his unique creative input). For more recent 
examples, see Carys J. Craig, Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law: Genius, Value, and 
Gendered Visions of the Creative Self, in DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS 273, 282 (Irene Calboli & Srividhya 
Ragavan eds., 2015) [hereinafter Craig, Feminist Aesthetics], and Rebecca Tushnet, The 
Romantic Author and the Romance Writer: Resisting Gendered Concepts of Creativity, in 
DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS 
294, 296 (Irene Calboli & Srividhya Ragavan eds., 2015) [hereinafter Tushnet, The 
Romantic Author]. See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Exceptional Authorship: The Role of 
Copyright Exceptions in Promoting Creativity, in THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF 
COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 15, 23 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2014) 
(using Foucault’s words in order to illustrate how the idealization of the romantic author 
resulted in excessive legal protection). 
14 DICKERMAN, supra note 12, at 19. 
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Michigan Museum of Art (UMMA). This exhibition provided a fresh 
perspective on the evolution of reductive minimalism. Minimalism, a 
form of art displaying “highly simplified, usually geometric form, 
clean composition, clear execution and impersonal appearance,”15 
“opened up a new field of art”16 in the late 1950’s, and is currently 
enjoying a resurgence of attention. The UMMA show’s focus on 
reductive Minimalism was intended, mainly, to criticize the frequent 
emphasis on male artists in Minimalism and to highlight the 
dialogical nature of this form of art.17 The museum displayed the 
differences between male and female artists in the field by “bringing 
together formative works from two generations of women Minimalist 
painters to examine and celebrate the dialogue between them” and 
“reveal the call-and-response of their artistic symbiosis.”18 
These four exhibitions underscore the interconnected nature of the 
creation of art and the social wrongs embedded in conceptions of 
solitary authorship. Moreover, they justify claims that copyright laws 
cannot privilege owners with entitlements incompatible with the 
nature of the creative act. At the same time, the exhibitions expose 
fundamental misconceptions and misunderstandings about the 
dialogic nature of creativity, such as the misconception that a creative 
dialogue is an invited activity. While Artists in Dialogue interpreted 
creative interaction as such invited activity, Inventing Abstraction and 
the other exhibitions emphasized the ubiquity of social and cultural 
interchange as a precondition for every creative expression. Though 
Artists in Dialogue concentrated on artists as originators of their 
artistic message and defined dialogical collaboration as a sequence of 
planned and deliberate events, the artistic message of the MOMA 
exhibition was that dialogue permeates the creative process. In each 
of the four exhibitions, dialogue was employed to explain artistic 
invention, but it was the show at the MOMA that adequately depicted 
dialogue as a different form of communication, an act transcending 
planned informational exchanges. As this Article argues, true 
dialogue is not an ordinary form of speech-communication like a 
discussion or a conversation carried on between two or more persons. 
 
15 ANN LEE MORGAN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ART AND ARTISTS 
313 (2007). 
16 HAL FOSTER, THE RETURN OF THE REAL 36 (1996). 
17 Reductive Minimalism: Women Artists in Dialogue, 1960–2014, UNIV. OF MICH. 
MUSEUM OF ART, https://web.archive.org/web/20140902200220/http://umma.umich.edu 
/view/exhibitions/2014-minimalism.php (last visited Dec. 10, 2016). The exhibition was 
on view at the museum from October 3, 2014, through January 25, 2015. 
18 Id. 
ZEMER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  10:19 AM 
148 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95, 141 
Nor is dialogue merely an evolutionary stylistic discourse with artistic 
predecessors. Dialogue does not require an invitation. It is a definable 
feature of every part of the creative process, whether spontaneous or 
planned. The eight works of art that resulted from the dialogue 
between Sandile Zulu and Henrique Oliveira are inherently dialogical, 
regardless of the invitation to collaborate. Although the result 
reflected intense collaboration, the works incorporate more than the 
information exchanged during the collaborative act. 
Intellectual property law regulates spaces of communication. While 
authorial works communicate thoughts and creative preferences using 
expressive, verbal, or other creative qualities, patents communicate 
scientific explorations and inventive ideas. Trademarks, through 
words and symbols, create a commercial language of source 
identification. This dual role of communication in intellectual 
property raises questions about the legitimacy of attaching exclusive 
rights to creative and innovative commodities.19 Copyright law is an 
amalgam of principles that aim to protect communicative spaces. For 
example, the main objective behind fair use, the distinction between 
ideas or expressions and the limited duration of copyright protection, 
is to facilitate “uncompensated transfers” of social wealth,20 which 
effectuate and expand communicative and dialogical opportunities by 
limiting the preemption of cultural properties. However, in practice, 
because these principles are ambiguous and broadly defined, they are 
unstable within the copyright system21 and seem ill suited to support 
 
19 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 53 (1996) (asking if an author deserves a 
right if he “is merely taking public goods – language, ideas, culture, humor, genre – and 
converting them to his or her own use”). On the nature of inventing as a social process, see 
Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (“Much social innovation, 
however, arises from communities rather than individual inventors, evolves from multiple 
histories, and entails expanding that which already exists from one context to another.”). 
See also Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 715–16 
(2012) (“[T]he vast majority of the most important inventions of the past two centuries . . . 
were themselves the result of gradual social processes in which multiple inventors 
developed the key parts of the invention at about the same time.”). For a similar argument 
on trademarks, see Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1 (1999) (arguing that trademarks are socially constructed and result from the social 
interaction between their creators and the public). 
20 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982). 
21 According to Merges, copyright systems define authorial rights so broadly “that they 
interfere with the freedom of fellow citizens.” MERGES, supra note 3, at 90. 
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and reward a landscape of dialogicality that engages the personality 
and inner processes of participants both present and absent.22 
This Article argues that dialogue does not require the physical 
presence of the other. A person who creatively expresses himself is 
constantly in dialogue with others. At the same time, dialogue can be 
understood as a combative communication in which one physically 
replies to the other. As in Artists in Dialogue, interaction in these 
situations reflects “verbal duels,” where each interlocutor aims to 
weaken the other or to win.23 This is only partially accurate: behind 
every “verbal duel” is a history of communication that precedes the 
moment when individuals first meet. Dialogue is a defining element 
of human relations and, as such, exists at all times. It is a constant 
expression of progressive interaction that, as explained in Inventing 
Abstraction, engages the other at all times, though not physically in 
any particular moment. Whether African or abstract, a work of art or 
literature is an evolutionary expression and response to social 
interactions, be it between invited collaborators or distant artists 
working in the same field. 
The four exhibitions exemplify the nature of dialogue as 
intertextual and intervocal between two states of beings: those of the 
artist and those of known and unknown others. In creating artistic and 
authorial expressions, dialoguers address and respond to a polyphony 
of voices. Dialoguers do not always know to whom and to how many 
they respond.24 This conception contrasts with other forms of 
intellectual property. In patent law, for example, in most cases, the 
patentee directs his invention to a particular need and can define the 
group of users for the product, while trademarks transmit a 
unidirectional communication to the public.25 Authors and artists 
engage in an unlimited dialogue, often with no particular direction. 
 
22 See infra Part V. 
23 DMITRI NIKULIN, ON DIALOGUE 2–3 (2006); cf. Valentina Pagliai, The Art of 
Dueling with Words: Towards a New Understanding of Verbal Duels Across the World, 24 
ORAL TRADITION 61 (2009) (criticizing the common view of verbal duels as expressions 
of aggression between interlocutors). 
24 See, e.g., JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS 
DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS (2008) (showing how crowds can create knowledge 
and respond to a multiplicity of voices without knowing each and every member of the 
crowd). 
25 Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of 
Copyright vis-à-vis Patent and Trademark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 229−30 (2008) 
(“The communication involved in trade-mark law is unidirectional. It flows from the trade-
mark owner to the public . . . . The life of a trade-mark as such is rooted in its owner’s 
control of its meaning.”). 
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 The unique social nature of dialogue renders it an advanced form 
of communication that defies closure and finality and perpetually 
serves as a “vehicle for reformulating old elements into new 
patterns.”26 
Copyrighted properties are dialogic for exactly the same reasons. 
First, they are not solitary activities but rather manifestations of the 
dialogic experiences of the writer, poet, author, or artist. Second, they 
are futuristic entities because they preclude finality and closure by 
allowing users (including artists and authors themselves) to take, 
quote, and share creative works, and to develop parts of a given work 
into new creative expressions. 
B. Bounded Dialogues 
Concepts of “dialogue” and “communication” are not entirely 
absent from scholarship opposing the expansion of ownership rights 
in intellectual property.27 However, scholars referring to these 
concepts have, in the past, failed to provide accurate definitions of the 
terms. Most scholars who use the concepts “communication” or 
 
26 Jan C. Swearingen, Dialogue and Dialectic: The Logic of Conversation and the 
Interpretation of Logic, in THE INTERPRETATION OF DIALOGUE 47 (Tulio Maranhão ed., 
1990). 
27 See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 46 (1998) (arguing that 
dialogue is a “powerful regulative ideal with which to orient political life”); CRAIG, 
COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, supra note 13, at 53−54 (explaining 
authorship as a dialogic process); JOANNA GIBSON, CREATING SELVES: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE NARRATION OF CULTURE 136 (2006) (endorsing the idea that the self 
is actualized through “dialogue with others, through the ‘selves of others’”); Kyle Asquith, 
Publicly Funded, then Locked Away: the Work of the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, in DYNAMIC FAIR DEALING: CREATING CANADIAN CULTURE ONLINE 90, 
99 (Rosemary J. Coombe et al. eds., 2014) (“What better way to create a dialogue and 
sense of community among Canadians than tossing content out into the public domain       
. . . ?”); Coombe, supra note 13 (criticizing strong intellectual property laws for stifling 
dialogical experiences); Drassinower, supra note 25, at 229−32 (arguing that fair use is a 
doctrine that facilitates creative dialogue and is an invitation to audiences to take part in 
this dialogue); Abraham Drassinower, From Distribution to Dialogue: Remarks on the 
Concept of Balance in Copyright Law, 34 J. CORP. L. 991, 1005 (2009) (arguing that the 
exceptions to the fair dealing doctrine are “signposts designed to order juridically a 
network of communicative acts and responses, utterances and replies, in which both 
authors and users are integral participants”); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social 
Dialogue in the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of 
Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1993) (discussing how 
liability rules in copyright harm the creative process by limiting social dialogue); Jeanne 
C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 116 (2014) 
(arguing that copyright law should be limited in order to encourage continuing 
conversation on the meaning of creative expressions). 
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“dialogue” are thrown in a specific direction of thought and enlist 
these terms as simple justificatory tools to define complex social 
realities.28 Scholars tend either to take these for granted or to view 
them as intuitive. Perhaps, like other social concepts, “‘dialogue’ has 
suffered from the tendency to be defined so generally that it becomes 
either a synonym for almost all human contact”29 or just “too nice a 
term.”30 Intellectual property scholars often criticize the antidialogical 
culture that dominates contemporary intellectual property affairs and 
argue that current efforts to expand intellectual property laws favor 
the hegemony of monological forms of meaning-making.31 This 
school of thought acknowledges that monologism perpetuates a subtle 
 
28 See sources cited supra note 27. 
29 John Stewart & Karen Zediker, Dialogue as Tensional, Ethical Practice, 65 S. 
COMM. J. 224, 224 (2000). 
30 Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 
864 (arguing that “[a] lot of what people are doing in a democracy is not dialogue: they are 
mobilizing, denouncing, sermonizing, pushing and pushing back”). Constitutional law 
provides ample examples for the use of the term “dialogue” in a way that reaps it of its 
normative benefits. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 577, 581 (1993) (arguing that the everyday process of constitutional interpretation 
requires dialogue between the three branches of government, and this allows the 
Constitution to be constantly interpreted “through an elaborate dialogue as to its 
meaning”); see also ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-66 (2004) 
(contending that “active and ongoing dialogue” amongst judges is a consequence of 
globalization); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational 
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 516−27 
(2000) (discussing possible cases of “transnational judicial conversations”); Emily 
Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1722, 1724 (2011) (defining dialogue as “a process of learning and understanding that 
enables deliberation toward a common end”); Paul S. Rouleau & Linsey Sherman, Doucet-
Boudreau, Dialogue and Judicial Activism: Tempest in a Teapot?, 41 OTTAWA L. REV. 
171 (2011) (analyzing the landmark decision of Doucet-Boudreau where the Supreme 
Court of Canada recognized the value of supervisory orders in crafting meaningful Charter 
remedies); Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 
1030 (2008) (criticizing a court for ignoring that “[g]enuine dialogue and consensus 
require mutual respect and attempts to experience the world from other reasonable points 
of view”); Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2570, 2586 (2004) (book review) (“In the dialogical conception [of comparative 
constitutionalism], comparative practices in judicial review offer a dynamic process apt to 
producing constitutional change.”). 
31 See COOMBE, supra note 26, at 86 (arguing that “[l]aws of intellectual property 
privilege monologic forms against dialogic practice and create significant power 
differentials between social actors engaged in hegemonic struggle”); see also MADHAVI 
SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL 
JUSTICE 8−11 (2012) (arguing that participation and shared meaning must play a decisive 
role in the design of intellectual property). 
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form of domination.32 However, it bypasses the true and authentic 
meaning of dialogue and offers an only limited understanding of 
dialogism, as deemed relevant to, or supportive of, such arguments.33 
The first conceptual wrong this chapter examines is that dialogues are 
invited activities. The second concerns the incomplete ways concepts 
of “dialogue” and “communication” are presently used in copyright 
discourses. 
Scholars embrace concepts of “dialogue” and “communication” in 
various specific contexts to explain distribution of copies.34 
Specifically, scholars use these concepts when communicating 
authorial messages to the public;35 encouraging “continuing 
conversation” over creative expression;36 freely communicating 
facts;37 demonstrating the importance of communication for freedom 
 
32 COOMBE, supra note 26, at 86 (“Laws of intellectual property privilege monologic 
forms against dialogic practice and create significant power differentials between social 
actors engaged in hegemonic struggle.”). 
33 A school of “copyright as communication” has emerged among Canadian scholars. 
Rosemary Coombe pioneered the discussion, and Carys Craig and Abraham Drassinower 
followed. See sources cited supra note 27. The Canadian School of “copyright as 
communication” depicts copyright as an ab initio limitation on communication. Id. In their 
arguments these scholars seem to treat communication as a monolithic construct. For a 
recent example, see ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015) 
(asserting that an author’s work is a communicative act, and copyright infringement is best 
understood as an unauthorized appropriation of another person’s speech). In fairness to the 
Canadian school, no one before or since has done much better. A theory of copyright as 
communication would have to mediate between the individuality of minds and their 
creative abilities and the commonality of discourse. It is incumbent upon any such theory 
to account for the different levels of communication, to explain when a conversation or 
ordinary communication rises to the level of dialogue, and to identify the resulting legal 
implications. This Article attempts to address some of these issues and to make clear the 
cluster of social ties that undergird a dialogical theory of copyright. 
34 See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 251 (Gr. Brit.). This historic 
decision of Lord Mansfield used the term “copy” in the technical sense—to signify an 
incorporeal right to the sole printing and publishing of something intellectual that was 
“communicated by letters.” Id. 
35 Drassinower, supra note 25, at 222 (declaring that “a work of authorship is an 
instance of communication addressed to the public”). 
36 Fromer, supra note 27, at 73. 
37 When the U.S. Supreme Court crowned copyright “the engine of free expression,” 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985), the Court 
meant that copyright is vital as an incentive for authors and artists to create social wealth. 
It also agreed with the Second Circuit, that the idea/expression dichotomy permits a 
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act “by permitting free 
communication of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.” Id. at 556 (quoting 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
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of expression in the age of new technologies;38 promoting user rights, 
whether as contributors to the meaning-making of creative works or 
as listeners;39 showing how institutional policies shackle the dialogic 
relations between creators and users in digital environments;40 and 
when discussing general theories on communication41 and democratic 
dialogue.42 None of those examples, however, reach the authentic and 
true meaning of dialogue. Scholars have avoided questioning dialogue 
conceptually and, as a result, have contributed to its restricted and 
bounded meaning.43 This avoidance perhaps stems from the 
perception that “copyright has ballooned well beyond” its legitimate 
proportions “and, in so doing, has strayed from its salutary speech-
enhancing core.”44 A full appreciation of “the significance of freedom 
of expression therefore requires appreciation of the nature and value 
of communicative activity.”45 
Furthermore, scholarly attempts to produce a theory of copyright as 
social interaction or communication have been only partially 
successful because they considered different levels of communication 
interchangeably. Such use discounts the fundamental distinction 
between communication and dialogue, which are distinct. For 
example, scholars use the terms “communication” and “dialogue” 
 
38 Free speech theories fueled decades of scholarly debates. On the intersection of free 
speech and copyright and the role of new technologies for communication, see NEIL 
WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 217 (2008) (asserting that 
communication technologies “make up our system of free expression”); see also Yochai 
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of 
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) (demonstrating how the enclosure 
movement in copyright risks the diversity of information sources in our information 
environment and its effect on the freedom of speech). 
39 Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 987–91 (1999) (discussing the role of listeners in meaning-making 
and reviewing decisions in which courts have recognized that listeners have an interest in 
communications). 
40 Asquith, supra note 27. 
41 CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, supra note 13; 
DRASSINOWER, supra note 33. 
42 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 
(1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright and Democratic Civil Society] (explaining the 
responsibility of copyright laws to the democratic character of civil societies); Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Assessing Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998) [hereinafter Netanel, Assessing Copyright’s Democratic 
Principles] (arguing that copyright owner authorization for certain acts will inhibit social 
dialogue and the dissemination of knowledge). 
43 To this general criticism there is perhaps one exception. See COOMBE, supra note 27. 
44 NETANEL, supra note 38, at 53. 
45 CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, supra note 13, at 227. 
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alongside concepts of “cultural conversation,” “discussion,” 
“discourse,” or “intercourse of language.”46 An understanding of the 
distinction between different levels of communication and the 
meaning of genuine dialogue would benefit the redesign of the legal 
principles affecting the existing normative boundaries of copyright. 
Although many copyright principles seem to encourage dialogue 
and communication, in practice, they often obstruct such social 
activities. The idea/expression dichotomy provides one useful 
example. The law treats ideas as raw, low-level materials, while 
expressions are considered high-level products needed to display the 
creativity eligible for legal protection.47 The inability of courts to 
fully distinguish ideas and expressions risks the delicate balance 
within copyright by potentially placing ideas under protection.48 This 
inability contributes to the industry’s success in depleting the public 
domain of its defining components.49 An understanding of 
copyrighted works as both communicative and as the products of 
genuine dialogue supports claims for more open user access rights to 
high-level expressive products. 
 
46 See, e.g., id. at 54 (“With her original expression the creative author is entering a 
cultural conversation that has been going on long before she appeared . . . .”); 
Drassinower, supra note 25, at 204 (“Authorship is not merely a mode of communication 
but a mode of discourse – an address that invites engagement in the mutual intercourse of 
language.”). 
47 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 364 (1991). On the 
definition and necessity of raw materials, see Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the 
Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355, 357 (2016). 
48 Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression 
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgements, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 231 (1990) 
(“Courts have no philosophical or objective basis on which to rely in trying to distinguish 
the ideas from the expression in works of art.”). This difficulty creates false beliefs that 
courts can provide a clear definition and interpretation of a literary work. See Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie, Refining Notions of Idea and Expression Through Linguistic Analysis, in 
COPYRIGHT AND PIRACY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 194, 204 (Lionel Bentley et 
al. eds., 2010) (“[C]ourts, who work daily with words, perhaps instinctively believe they 
understand the nature of literary works.”); see also Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright 
Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2015) (discussing the complexity of 
copyright’s interpretive choice regime). 
49 As Marcus Boon recently wrote: 
as our ability to make copies expands at both macro (geophysics and the 
manipulation of global weather systems) and micro (nanotechnology and the 
fabrication and replication of matter from the atom up) levels, [intellectual 
property laws] are used by corporations to appropriate, copy, and sell 
increasingly large parts of what was once the “public domain.” 
MARCUS BOON, IN PRAISE OF COPYING 4–5 (2010). 
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Another example of how copyright principles can obstruct dialogue 
and communication can be found in the doctrine of fair use. Rebecca 
Tushnet recently disputed the ability of courts to apply fair use in 
ways that accommodate multiple meanings and interpretations of 
art—a situation that has resulted in creative humility.50 Courts “rarely 
acknowledge multiplicity of meaning.”51 Instead, they take “a 
universalist perspective that denies that different observers might 
generate different meanings from the same view.”52 Limiting the 
multiplicity of meanings affects authors’ creative development and 
curtails the dialogical platforms where meaning-making occurs. 
Dialogue and meanings should not be bounded or socially enclosed. 
Although it is perhaps too much to expect that courts draw a complete 
workable distinction between ideas and expressions or apply a 
postmodern understanding of the limits of copyright before declaring 
whether a use is fair or not, definitional challenges must not create a 
legal reality that favors authors and industry to the detriment of users 
and the public. A distinction between different levels of 
communication may alleviate these outcomes. 
This Article argues that copyright law regulates dialogical 
transactions, both between authors and between authors and the 
public. Using “transaction,” a term drawn from economic theory, to 
depict social processes is new to the literature on intellectual property. 
This Article introduces the concept of dialogical transactions as a tool 
to correct some of the misconceptions we nurture in copyright 
systems. Dialogical transactions define the reciprocal and mutual 
process of creating copyrighted materials,53 especially in today’s 
rapid expansion of virtual markets. This analysis departs from the 
 
50 Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 
25 LAW & LIT. 20, 22 (2013). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. This is perhaps a result of judges becoming arbiters of art. Eric Felten, Is It Art? 
Increasingly, Nowadays, That’s a Judicial Decision, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303640104577438242141270380. A 
good example to the contrary is a decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals where 
the court accepted a claim for fair use and artistic borrowing, and did not depend on its 
“own poorly honed artistic sensibilities,” or question “artistic purposes.” Blanch v. Koons, 
467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. 
L. REV. 805, 807 (2005) (“[J]udges should refrain from indulging in subjective aesthetic 
determinations.”). 
53 Reciprocity in dialogue is different from mutuality. The former “implies the 
recognition of the other qua other . . . , it implies recognition through the dialogically 
mediated presence of the other” while “mutuality is exercised in the immediate presence of 
the other . . . .” NIKULIN, supra note 23, at xi. 
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economic approach to copyright and argues that economic theories 
cannot adequately explain the creative process. To borrow from 
Richard Sennett, present-day creative culture resembles “intimate 
society.”54 In that society, “all social phenomena, no matter how 
impersonal in structure, are converted into matters of personality in 
order to have a meaning.”55 
The Article is divided into six parts. Following the introduction, 
Part I defines dialogue as a web of social transactions and explains 
how authors depend on their availability. Parts II and III describe the 
distinction between communication and dialogue by tracing how the 
dialogic relationship impacts both the making of authors and the 
actual expressions of their talent. These Parts also examine the nature 
of dialogism, its etymological and historical roots, and present three 
dominant theories of dialogue: one by the Russian literary 
philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, another by the philosopher Martin 
Buber, and the third by quantum physicist David Bohm. The main 
rationale for drawing from these three philosophers is their belief that 
the very center of the human universe is the dialogical. These Parts 
also demonstrate how the current configuration of copyright law, if 
defined as a site of genuine dialogical transactions, awards rights 
incommensurate with the nature of creativity. Part IV discusses the 
manner in which the essential features of dialogue have been 
marginalized in the evolutionary process of contemporary copyright, 
and critically examines copyright intricacies such as parodies, 
architecture, urban art, and information networks. 
I 
AUTHORS AND SOCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
Authorship, in its basic definition as a unique expression of 
creative personalities, legitimizes exclusive ownership of creative 
expressions. The U.S. Supreme Court has applied this understanding, 
holding that because authors are independent creators of creativity,56 
copyright law must secure them “a fair return” in order “to stimulate 
artistic creativity for the general public good.”57 Similar approaches 
 
54 RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 219 (1977). 
55 Id. 
56 In Feist, when the Supreme Court introduced the requirement of a modicum of 
creativity for copyright protection, it meant, as Justice O’Connor remarked, “that the work 
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works) . . . .” 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
57 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
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over the past three decades have been met with ample scholarly reply, 
rejecting the Wordsworthian vision of creation as “the spontaneous 
overflow of powerful feelings,”58 and holding the view of authorial 
texts as representations of creative collectivity and preexisting 
materials.59 According to these replies, the materials necessary for the 
creative process are created in a communal space where authors and 
the public communicate, consume knowledge, and create trading 
zones of collaboration.60 The modern author is not merely, as in 
primitive times, a member of a social group that controls his thought 
and action; he is the point of intersection of many social influences.61 
However, the present copyright culture—with its defense of concepts 
like trespass and exclusive ownership embedded within legal rules 
and policies—promulgates this wrong assumption about the 
individual as the independent creator and sole proprietor of the 
expressions of his talent.62 One of the main consequences of this 
culture is foreclosure of communicative spaces.63 
Copyright (as the law that regulates the ties between creators, 
contributors, and takers) is expected to create and develop social 
channels through which creative individuals mutually transact cultural 
 
58 William Wordsworth & Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Preface to LYRICAL BALLADS: 
WITH A FEW OTHER POEMS (1798).  
59 Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1151, 1202 (2007) (asserting that “anyone who has an interest in the content of culture and 
the direction of cultural progress . . . must engage with what is already there”). 
60 See sources cited supra note 13; see also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE 
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 141 (1993) (arguing that “the notorious difficulty of applying 
copyright doctrine to concrete cases can be related to the persistence of the discourse of 
original genius and to the problems inherent in reifications of author and work”); Michael 
J. Madison, Comment, Where Does Creativity Come From? And Other Stories of 
Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747 (2003); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and 
the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author,” 17 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984). 
61 Accepting the social construction of creation, Merges asserts that “genius awakens 
another genius.” MERGES, supra note 3, at 92. 
62 CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, supra note 13, at 21 
(asserting that “the fetishisation of the individual and original author is still very much 
alive in our current construction of copyright and the policies that inform its 
development”). 
63 Coombe, supra note 13, at 1855 (claiming that intellectual property laws “stifle 
dialogic practices – preventing us from using the most powerful, prevalent, and accessible 
cultural forms to express identity, community and difference”); Hughes, supra note 39, at 
924 (explaining that in deconstructionist approaches to copyright “changes in meaning are 
welcome and property rights should be limited to give non-owners greater breadth to shape 
their own messages”). 
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and personal properties.64 This expectation requires an understanding 
of copyright as a complex web of social transactions, where each 
transaction requires “a mutual exchange of information or influence 
based on negotiation and reciprocity.”65 Literature on copyright, 
though accepting the sociality of the creative act, has failed to explore 
the creative process as a social transaction. The view of copyright as a 
social transaction is inevitable and connects previously disjointed 
approaches to copyright.66 Whether utilitarian or author-based,67 
copyright theories share the goal of developing ways to explain and 
deal with the consequences of the binary relations between owners 
 
64 The same rationale applies to inventorship. Similar to creative works of literature or 
drama, inventions are social acts. Every invention involves “a variety of social 
relationships with real and imaginary others, with individuals as well as social collective.” 
KAREN BURKE LEFEVRE, INVENTION AS A SOCIAL ACT 46 (1987); see also sources cited 
supra note 19. 
65 TIM O’SULLIVAN ET AL., KEY CONCEPTS IN COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL 
STUDIES 318 (John Fiske ed., 2d ed. 1994); see also LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 
4 (1986) (stating that reciprocity “has been held to be a central feature of social 
transactions, and the determining factor in the development of personal and political 
power”). 
66 This Article makes no claim to reduce all relations to social or economic 
transactions. As David Gamage and Allon Kedem remarked: “To claim that all human 
interactions can be categorized as either ‘economic’ or ‘social’ is to ignore the complexity 
that attends real-world relationships.” David Gamage & Allon Kedem, Commodification 
and Contract Formation: Placing the Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations, 
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1326 (2006). This Article uses social transaction as a unique 
paradigm to question the dialogical content of copyrighted properties and to value the 
quality of their social wealth. In doing so, this Article follows the distinction between 
social transaction and its economic counterpart, because while the latter normally focuses 
on markets, production, distribution and consumption, the former centers on 
communication and social interaction. See Mauro F. Guillén et al., The Revival of 
Economic Sociology, in THE NEW ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY: DEVELOPING IN AN EMERGING 
FIELD 1, 14 (Mauro F. Guillén et al. eds., 2002). This Author concurs with arguments that 
market activities are “intensely social – as social as kinship networks or feudal armies.” 
Harrison C. White, Varieties in Market, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A NETWORK APPROACH 
226, 232 (Barry Wellman & S.D. Berkowitz eds., 1988); see also Viviana A. Zelizer, 
Making Multiple Monies, in EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 193, 194 (Richard 
Swedberg ed., 1993) [hereinafter Zelizer, Making Multiple Monies] (“The market should 
not be set in opposition to extra-economic socio-cultural factors.”). However, as recent 
studies show, the tradition of economic arguments “repeatedly focus[ing] on firms and 
corporations” is still dominant and distances itself from social arguments. Viviana A. 
Zelizer, Intimate Transactions, in THE NEW ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY: DEVELOPING IN AN 
EMERGING FIELD 274, 283 (Mauro F. Guillén et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Zelizer, 
Intimate Transactions]. Zelizer criticizes the tradition of law and economics for its 
inability to incorporate social and intimate transactions within its scope. Id. at 285–90. 
67 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1745, 1749–59 (2012) (discussing the distinction between utilitarianism and moral rights 
theories as applied to copyright). Fromer criticizes this distinction and argues that “the two 
theories can be complementary in important ways.” Id. at 1746. 
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and users. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, scholars 
exploring these theories have concentrated primarily on the role of 
incentives68 rewards, or the morality of authorial autonomy, and in 
this way left untouched the many flaws they proclaim to have 
challenged. 
Social transactions “expand the compass of social interaction and 
the structure of social relations.”69 They are the basic units of analysis 
in social institutions where agents draw on rational principles of 
justice and social norms.70 There is no enumerated set of 
generalizations that encompasses them all. Social transactions are 
those acts of communication we explore in different levels and 
intensity every day.71 When a customer enters a convenience store in 
Italy and asks for a French butter, he socially transacts informational 
properties relevant to his choice of butter—French, in particular. 
When a visitor enters a museum with a group of friends and curators 
and views a never-before-seen painting, he may enter into a more 
intimate conversation that will involve a personal dimension that is 
irrelevant to the customer buying French butter. In contrast, when an 
artist invites a group of fellow artists to his exhibition, he expects a 
higher level of interaction. If he takes comments made by visitors 
seriously, the comments may inform his future works. This social 
transaction signifies more than mere informational exchanges or 
views. The artist—in a way similar to the collaboration between 
Sandile Zulu and Henrique Oliveira, or different artists present and 
distant, contributing to the emergence of conceptual art, or the artistic 
symbiotic relations between women Minimalist painters72—
internalizes and responds to certain parts of others’ personalities, 
creative ideals, and cultural preferences.73 
 
68 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1569, 1577 (2009) (asserting that “central to all of copyright law is the idea of 
incentives”); see also Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 
(2003). 
69 PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 263 (1964). 
70 Dennis J. Baker, The Impossibility of a Critically Objective Criminal Law, 56 
MCGILL L.J. 349, 368 (2011). 
71 See generally TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI, SOCIAL PROCESSES: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
SOCIOLOGY 1–31 (1986). 
72 See infra Part I.A. 
73 It should be noted that it is not only the interaction between the people to a social 
event that impacts the social transaction. “[N]on-human actors in any social situation” play 
a significant role in the construction of the transaction. ANDREW MURRAY, INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY LAW: THE LAW AND SOCIETY 66 (2013). For example, when two people 
meet in a restaurant or a museum, the place of meeting affects the social interaction 
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In his sociocultural transactional model of human interaction, Ali 
Darwish explains different levels of social transaction by using three 
concentric circles of interaction: social, interpersonal, and 
intrapersonal.74 Most human interactions take place within the social 
ring of interaction. Renting a car, having a conversation in the grocery 
store, talking to your employer, using telephone banking services, or 
commenting to an online post are examples of this social ring. 
Interpersonal interaction refers to closer, more intimate relationships, 
like friendship, which reflect a greater level of interpersonal 
bindingness.75 To explain intrapersonal interaction, Darwish 
identifies the “black box” in which internal communication, or silent 
soliloquy, takes place.76 The removal of an idea from the 
intrapersonal to the interpersonal involves moving an idea from the 
private to the public, from the internal to the dialogical. The latter 
process often requires the former: “[W]e might talk through an 
argument to ourselves in private, or wrestle with the assembly 
instructions for some piece of knock-together furniture.”77 However, 
these internal activities, as useful and necessary as they may be, are 
merely pre-stages that require “shared agreements as to what these 
symbolic forms are to be taken to be” in order to generate meaning.78 
Copyrighted materials are built similarly. Copyrighted works are 
not created in a social vacuum: authors interact and converse with 
other creative individuals, enclosing ideas and other social facts 
received from the common stock. The level of interaction is not static 
and ranges from social to interpersonal. Authors also cultivate 
enclosed ideas and thoughts in their intrapersonal realm. It is only 
when an author decides to free his ideas from his intrapersonal “black 
box” that a creative work becomes subject to interpersonal reactions. 
As Carys Craig put it: 
 
between them. “[O]ne would expect a different transaction in a luxury Michelin-starred 
restaurant than in a local café bar. The difference is not so much the surroundings 
themselves but the semiotic, or concepts, which the human actors have communicated to 
them through memory, experience and surroundings.” Id. 
74 ALI DARWISH, SOCIAL SEMIOTICS OF ARABIC SATELLITE TELEVISION: BEYOND THE 
GLAMOUR 184–85 (2009). 
75 See Jon Cauley & Todd Sandler, A General Theory of Interpersonal Exchange, 35 
PUB. CHOICE 587, 587–606 (1980) (examining the role of social transactions for 
“interpersonal bindingness”). 
76 DARWISH, supra note 74, at 186. 
77 Andy Lock & Tom Strong, Introduction to SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM: SOURCES 
AND STIRRINGS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (Andy Lock & Tom Strong eds., 2010). 
78 Id. 
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When the author creates original expression in the form of 
literature, art, drama or music, she is engaged in an intrapersonal 
dialogue (developing a form of personal narrative by drawing upon 
experience, situation, and critical reflection) and an interpersonal 
dialogue (drawing upon the texts and discourses around her to 
communicate meaning to an anticipated audience).79 
All social transactions share two common characteristics: First, 
social transactions are not mere ideals, but social requirements. As the 
basic units of social institutions,80 they are so fundamental that they 
may, as Lawrence Becker asserts, lead to the imposition of blame 
upon those who disturb social exchanges and reciprocation, 
“punish[ing] them or extract[ing] compensation from them for their 
failure to reciprocate.”81 
Second, social transactions entail a causal connection. They 
involve a line of action that begins with one person’s behavior, is 
carried on by others, and is finally terminated by the contributions of 
still others. “No one carries out the entire transaction alone, although 
some participants play a more important part than others . . . . Thus, 
what happens cannot be explained solely in terms of the attitudes, 
motives and personality traits of the individuals involved . . . .”82 In 
other words, social transactions are constructed “over time in a 
succession of reciprocating adjustments and readjustments of the 
participating individuals to one another.”83 Each “person’s 
contributions are aligned with those of others to make up the total 
enterprise.”84 
Copyrighted works, as sites of multiple social transactions, reflect 
these common characteristics. First, because authorship and creative 
works are social constructs,85 authors never carry the “entire 
transaction alone.”86 That is, “the texts, discourses, experiences and 
relationships that constitute the author are combined, interpreted, 
reinterpreted and retold.”87 The social construction of authorship 
 
79 CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, supra note 13, at 53–54. 
80 Baker, supra note 70. 
81 BECKLER, supra note 65, at 130. 
82 SHIBUTANI, supra note 71, at 7. 
83 Id. LeFevre claimed that inventing is “an act that generally is initiated by inventors 
and brought to completion by the audience, often extending over time through a series of 
social transactions and texts.” LEFEVRE, supra note 64, at 47. 
84 SHIBUTANI, supra note 71, at 6–7. 
85 Zemer, supra note 13. 
86 SHIBUTANI, supra note 71, at 7. 
87 CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, supra note 13, at 51. 
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dictates that without appreciating reciprocity as necessary “for the 
generation of primary human goods,”88 works of art, literature, 
drama, or choreography would be impossible.89 Reciprocity is 
inherent in every social transaction and is therefore crucial to the 
increased and diverse understanding of the common stock of 
knowledge. Those who disturb access to copyrighted works, whether 
through new sets of legal rules or invalid ownership claims, discount 
reciprocity as a requirement for such works and restrict fundamental 
social transactions. 
Second, principles of copyright law address these concerns through 
a built-in system of reciprocation and compensation. For example, 
copyright laws limit ownership to expressions, not ideas;90 create an 
open-ended list of known and ad hoc exceptions to the right;91 subject 
the right to an expiration date after which the work resides in the 
public domain;92 and provide only certain creators with a moral right 
in their expression.93 Unlike patent law, which grants a patent holder 
the right to exclude others from practicing the invention for a typical 
term of twenty years,94 copyright law allows the public greater rights 
of access. These rights are built on reciprocal and compensatory 
relations. Authors and the public reciprocate in order to form 
copyrighted works. This is the nature of creative work: socially 
constructed, historically contingent, and premised on the exchange of 
ideas, information, and other properties of knowledge within society. 
The law then attempts to compensate the public through, for example, 
the fair use doctrine, in exchange for allowing authors to privately 
own properties that were collectively owned before they became part 
of a new work. In other words, copyright laws invite authors to 
transact with fellow authors and the general public. In return for new 
 
88 BECKER, supra note 65, at 132. 
89 See generally LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (2007) 
(discussing the social construction theory and arguing that copyrighted works are jointly 
created by the public and authors). 
90 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d 
Cir. 1930). 
91 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
92 Id. § 302. 
93 Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (tit. VI), 104 Stat. 
5128. Scholars argue that the availability of moral rights in the United States is too limited. 
Most notably see KWALL, supra note 3; see also Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis 
and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 452 (2009) (contemplating that the VARA is 
“largely insufficient”); cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 
781, 853 (2005) (praising VARA’s “balanced and sophisticated approach”). 
94 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012). 
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and creative social wealth, authors own a plot of the social reality. In 
Hohfeldian terms, once a transaction takes place, and a copyrighted 
work has been created, the law imposes on authors and the public 
correlative rights and duties both to keep their relations balanced and 
to maintain a stable order for future social transactions.95 The law 
limits the spectrum of the rights in exchange for a public duty to 
recognize and protect the expenditure of labor and personality in 
creating the work. Once the work is released to the public, the social 
transaction thrives through continued communication and exchange 
with the audience about the meaning of the work and its cultural 
future.96 
The entrenched system of reciprocation and compensation in 
copyright signifies a need for vibrant communication between authors 
and between authors and the public. Every social transaction that 
leads to a copyrighted work is not ordinary. It begins in the first 
concentric circle depicted by Ali Darwish, but goes far beyond.97 It is 
an advanced act of communication that is not simply a talk or 
conversational exchange, but a dialogical embodiment of the other 
who contributed to the formation of the work. It is dialogical by 
virtue of the properties it involves and the role of interpersonal and 
intrapersonal communication it requires. A dialogical transaction 
signifies, as the following Parts show, “a live communication rather 
than a sheer exchange of meaningful words. It is a communication 
based upon communion from where words may follow, but words do 
not constitute it.”98 
 
95 WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1919) (devising a comprehensive legal 
taxonomy, comprising the terms right, duty, privilege, and power as categories of 
entitlements attached to private property). For useful accounts of the Hohfeldian 
classification, see Jeremy Waldron, Introduction to THEORIES OF RIGHTS 1, 4–9 (Jeremy 
Waldron ed., 1984) and Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1354–78 (1989) (illustrating how the Hohfeldian paradigm applies to 
copyright). 
96 Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of 
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 848 (1990) 
(asserting that “it is on the audience that the art work depends for its continued existence, 
and not on the artist”). The role of the audience in intellectual property is not limited to 
providing a forum to which creative expressions are directed. The audience also plays an 
important role in cases of infringement, because different audiences, expert or lay, will 
evaluate infringement differently. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience 
in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2014). 
97 See DARWISH, supra note 74. 
98 Goutam Biswas, Martin Buber’s Concept of Art as Dialogue, in MARTIN BUBER 
AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 223, 223 (Maurice Friedman ed., 1996). 
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II 
THE LIMITS OF CONVERSATIONS 
Although scholars view copyrighted works as social constructs or 
embodiments of complex communicative relations and experiences, 
or even develop sociocultural approaches premised on theories of 
communication,99 these approaches fail to distinguish between the 
levels of communication required to understand creativity. Works of 
art and authorship are always expressions of a complex history of 
different levels of interaction. These include spontaneous works and 
works emerging from sheer happenstance or serendipity, such as 
Zapruder’s images of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 
or the chance creations of Dada artists.100 Also included are works 
created away from civilization, on a deserted island reminiscent of 
that in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, since the mere ability to create, to 
appreciate, and to respond to creative expressions derives from early 
social interactions with others and reciprocity.101 The lack of a 
comprehensive theory of communication, relevant to copyright, 
capable of distinguishing between different levels of communication 
and interaction, creates a false perception that we can define 
communication in convenient and monolithic ways, and thus, perhaps 
bypass its inherent complexity. Consequently, the ability of existing 
scholarship to offer an explanation for this complexity is very limited. 
In what follows, this Article examines and contrasts the two dominant 
modes of communication—conversation and dialogue—often used to 
measure the intensity and level of interaction necessary for the 
creative act. 
Such a distinction requires a general definition of the system of 
communication. In his seminal theory of communication, sociologist 
Charles Cooley observed, “[t]he existing system of communication 
determines the reach of the environment. Society is a matter of the 
incidence of men upon one another” and “this incidence is a matter of 
 
99 See sources cited supra note 27. 
100 Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
101 See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. According to Glăveanu, “the social 
element is present even when creative acts are performed in complete solitude” since, in 
absence of sociality, the creator will be unable to recognize and cultivate her creativity. 
Vlad Petre Glăveanu, Distributing Creativity: Three Thought Experiments, in 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SCIENCE OF CREATIVE THINKING 67, 74 
(Giovanni Emanuele Corazza & Sergio Agnoli eds., 2015). Therefore, the key question in 
the Deserted Island scenario is whether the creator experienced any human contact prior to 
her arrival to the island. 
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communication.”102 Cooley did not define communication to the 
degree necessary for authors and artists to create, but if creative 
expressions are products of communication, they cannot be treated as 
“something independent of surroundings, but rather a characteristic 
way of reacting upon them.”103 When authors sit down to write they 
take into the act a multiplicity of contributions. Writings that 
successfully qualify for copyright protection reflect this multiplicity 
and the presence of others in the process. This presence comes in 
multiple degrees and deserves further explanation. 
According to prevalent theory, communication can be understood 
in various ways. Communication is not static and does not conform to 
a particular form nor can it be captured under one particular 
definition. Studies on communication show that it has many, 
sometimes competing, meanings.104 Communication can mean 
partaking, connection, linkage, transfer, transmission, exchange, or it 
can serve as a general term for “symbolic interaction.”105 Levels of 
communication also differ in terms of the intensity of exchange they 
require and display. To Leo Lowenthal, “true communication entails a 
communion, a share of inner experience.”106 In other words, there are 
different levels of talk. On the one hand, a simple talk mirrors 
conversational pleasure and may refer to the exchange of views, 
words, and other types of simple verbal expressions.107 On the other 
hand, true talk “refers to a special kind of talk, distinguished by 
intimacy and disclosure. An even more intense sense of 
communication as exchange dispenses with talk altogether and posits 
a meeting of minds, psychosemantic sharing, even fusion of 
consciousness.”108 
 
102 Charles H. Cooley, The Process of Social Change, 12 POL. SCI. Q. 63, 73–74 
(1897). 
103 Id. at 78. 
104 JAMES R. HURFORD, THE ORIGINS OF MEANING: LANGUAGE IN THE LIGHT OF 
EVOLUTION 168 (2007) (“Defining communication precisely is problematic . . . . For any 
proposed definition of communication, we can think of some action fitting the definition 
that we would not want, intuitively, to characterize as communication . . . . And conversely 
we can think of some other kind of action that is, counterintuitively, excluded.”). 
105 JOHN DURHAM PETERS, SPEAKING INTO THE AIR: A HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF 
COMMUNICATION 7–9 (1999). 
106 Leo Lowenthal, Communications and Humanitas, in THE HUMAN DIALOGUE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNICATION 335, 336 (Floyd W. Matson & Ashley Montagu eds., 
1967). 
107 See PETERS, supra note 105, at 8. 
108 Id. 
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Conversation is defined as a low-level communicative mode. It is a 
“simple, bilateral, cooperative” activity.109 Conversation refers to the 
exchange of ideas between two or more participants specifically 
through speech.110 In the early modern period, the concept had two 
meanings. First, in its wider sense, conversation was understood as 
“the act of living with and sharing the company of others . . . . In this 
sense, one did not have a ‘conversation’ with strangers.”111 The 
second meaning of conversation was “the act of speaking and 
discussing with others”112 in order to please the conversationalists. It 
is the latter meaning that became the dominant understanding of the 
word in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.113 
Eighteenth-century studies tell us that the goal of communicative 
dealings is the conveyance of pleasure between conversationalists. 
For example, a study of conversation in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century France has found that the aim of salon conversations was 
“none other than the pleasure of conversation for its own sake.”114  
For Henry Fielding, the “art of pleasing or doing good to one another” 
 
109 John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, 
Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1077 (2015). 
110 See Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital 
Speech, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 355, 371 (2012) (providing examples for low-level 
conversations such as a talk “between friends in the street, over the telephone or in the 
pub,” inexpensive communication, and spontaneous comments); see also JOHN MULLAN, 
HOW NOVELS WORK 143 (2006) (explaining that the frequent use of telephone 
conversations in novels is a way to dramatize failures of communication). 
 This Part is a definitional exercise. As such, it is open to criticism on the categories 
used. This Author accepts that conversation can be defined more broadly to encompass a 
more intellectual exchange of knowledge. For example, Henry Fielding wrote: 
The primitive and literal sense of [conversation] is, I apprehend, to turn round 
together; and in its more copious usage we intend by it that reciprocal 
interchange of ideas by which truth is examined, things are, in a manner, turned 
round and sifted, and all our knowledge communicated to each other. 
HENRY FIELDING, ESSAY ON CONVERSATION 2 (1743) (emphasis added). That is, 
conversation does not only relate to “habits of speech, but to a larger pattern of personal 
dealings.” G.A. Starr, From Socrates to Sarah Fielding, in PASSIONATE ENCOUNTERS IN A 
TIME OF SENSIBILITY 118 (Maximillian E. Novak & Anne K. Mellor eds., 2000). 
However, for matters of argumentative clarity, this Article contrasts conversation with 
dialogue. 
111 Richard Yeo, John Locke on Conversation with Friends and Strangers, 26(2) 
PARERGON 1, 12 (2009). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 BENEDETTA CRAVERI, THE AGE OF CONVERSATION 342 (Teresa Waugh trans., 
2005), cited in STEPHEN MILLER, CONVERSATION: A HISTORY OF A DECLINING ART 13–
14 (2006). 
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defines the art of conversation.115 For David Hume, a conversation—
which he calls a “transcript of the mind”—is nothing “but the 
pleasure it conveys to those who are present.”116 In contrast, to 
nineteenth-century English essayist Thomas De Quincey, pleasure is 
too low a threshold for a definition of conversation. He wrote, 
“Amongst the arts connected with the elegances of social life, in a 
degree that nobody denies, is the art of Conversation . . . .”117 Hence, 
a conversation does not only provide low-level social pleasure 
because, for De Quincey, conversation is not simple talk. Contrasting 
“conversation” and “talk,” De Quincey finds that there is, in a 
conversational act, an “absolute birth of new insight into the truth 
itself, inseparable from the finer and more scientific exercise of the 
talking art.”118 When merely talking, the participants enjoy limited 
intercourse with the thoughts and imagination of others. When 
authors and artists converse, they play with, consume, and internalize 
the properties of the conversation in a De Quincey-like way, and they 
also communicate with the social surroundings of the conversational 
event. In this process, the conversation reaches a higher 
communicative level. 
For William Hazlitt, like De Quincey, conversation is an advanced 
form of communication, one in which authors must engage to produce 
lasting creative works. Hazlitt, once labeled “the first modern 
man,”119 wrote in the September 1820 London Magazine that those 
authors who write books of memory converse not only with fellow 
authors, but also address the social characteristics of society.120 
Hazlitt lived and wrote when Romanticism flourished, and he 
believed that authors were unique. Even so, Hazlitt asserted that 
unique individuals like authors still needed to speak a common 
language that would attract and be understood by a circle of 
readers.121 He explained: 
Persons of different trades and professions – the mechanic, the 
shop-keeper, the medical practitioner, the artist, etc., may all have 
 
115 FIELDING, supra note 110. 
116 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, bk. II, pt. iii, § iv, at 9 (1739). 
117 THOMAS DE QUINCEY, LETTERS TO A YOUNG MAN AND OTHER PAPERS 127 
(1854). 
118 Id. at 132. 
119 DUNCAN WU, WILLIAM HAZLITT: THE FIRST MODERN MAN (2008). 
120 William Hazlitt, On the Conversation of Authors (London Magazine Sept., 1820), in 
SELECTED ESSAYS OF WILLIAM HAZLITT 1778–1830, at 446 (William Hazlitt & Geoffrey 
Keynes eds., 1917). 
121 Hazlitt, supra note 120, at 450. 
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great knowledge and ingenuity in their several vocations . . . but 
over and above this professional and technical knowledge, they 
must be supposed to have a stock of common sense and common 
feeling to furnish subjects of common conversation, or to give them 
any pleasure in each other’s company. It is to this common stock of 
ideas, spread over the surface, or striking its roots into the very 
centre of society, that the popular writer appeals, and not in vain; 
for he finds readers . . . .122 
Hazlitt believed in the authorial power of educated gentlemen and 
wrote, 
[t]he world itself is a volume larger than all the libraries in it. 
Learning is a sacred deposit from the experience of ages; but it has 
not put all future experience on the shelf, or debarred the common 
heard of mankind from the use of their hands, tongues, eyes, ears, or 
understandings.123 
For Hazlitt, authors could produce new knowledge, and in order to 
do so, they needed conversational habits that went beyond simple 
talks as acts of pleasing.124 Thus, for both Hazlitt and De Quincey, 
conversation was an act of exploring and knowledge creation. 
Unlike observers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whose 
emphases were on pleasure, memorable readership, and 
conversational exploration, contemporary theorists express different 
concerns. They trace the influences on conversations and the shapes 
they take, inquire into the structure of conversations,125 offer 
sociolinguistic analyses,126 and explore implications from gender 
theories.127 Modern theorists also note that some groups “tend to 
dwell on the emotional rewards that come from conversation and 





125 See, e.g., DONALD E. ALLEN & REBECCA F. GUY, CONVERSATION ANALYSIS 11 
(1974) (“Conversation is the primary basis of direct social relations between persons. As a 
process occurring in real time, conversation constitutes a reciprocal and rhythmic 
interchange of verbal emissions.” It involves “a tendency towards consensus.”); see also 
MICHAEL MOERMAN, TALKING CULTURE: ETHNOGRAPHY AND CONVERSATION 
ANALYSIS (1988); JACK SIDNELL, CONVERSATION ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION (2010). 
126 See, e.g., DEIRDRE BURTON, DIALOGUE AND DISCOURSE: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC 
APPROACH TO MODERN DRAMA DIALOGUE AND NATURALLY OCCURRING 
CONVERSATION (2008). 
127 See, e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, GENDER AND CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION 
(1993). 
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conversation strengthens our ties with friends.”128 Recent legal 
scholarship applies a similar rationale to statutory interpretation, 
showing that conversations are ordinary communicative experiences 
and that, because conversational events are automatic and 
spontaneous, their influence on statutory interpretation is limited.129 
Whether for pleasure, ideological interchange, emotional reward, or 
interpretation of legal texts, a conversation is mainly understood as an 
ordinary act of speech, a low-level communicative event. At the same 
time, conversations are not devoid of value. Conversations serve as 
important platforms for communication. They provide meeting points 
with closure for individuals, and therein lies their social status. As a 
low-level interaction, a conversation, as opposed to a dialogue, is a 
confined social act; it does not require continuity. When Arnold 
Lakhovsky painted The Conversation (1935), he portrayed 
conversation as a momentary act of communication between 
participants to a social gathering—a spontaneous and informal 
interchange of information with limited emotional involvement. 
Conversations, brief verbal encounters, or occasional discussions 
facilitate communication between individuals. Even if conversations 
do not normally serve as prolonged inspirational sources for creating 
or interpreting cultural properties, authoring a novel or play, or 
making a collage, they provide conversationalists a meeting point 
from which to develop further communication. They contribute some 
of the raw materials to the creative process: common language, 
general structures and information, and undeveloped ideas and 
abstractions. For a copyrightable work to emerge, an author requires 
conversations and ideas; but to consolidate, to become an expression 
worthy of protection, the author needs intensive social interaction, a 
deeper involvement of the other whose footsteps can be traced while 
engaging with the text or interpreting the work. When Stephen Miller 
labeled conversation a “declining art,” he began his criticism by 
defining conversation as an advanced form of communication.130 
Miller then criticized social changes that rendered conversations 
redundant, empty social vessels.131 As the following Parts will show, 
 
128 MILLER, supra note 114, at 20; see also id. at 10–28; DEBORAH TANNEN, 
CONVERSATIONAL STYLE: ANALYZING TALK AMONG FRIENDS (2005). 
129 Jill C. Anderson, Misreading Like a Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory 
Interpretation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1578 (2014); see also Deborah Hellman, 
Unintended Implications, 101 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2015). 
130 MILLER, supra note 114. 
131 Id. 
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if copyright will not protect a robust system of dialogicality, the very 
subject matter that copyright was designed to protect, namely original 
works of authorship and art that display social value, will become 
low-level communicative constructs—empty social vessels. The next 
Part further explains the social boundaries of conversations and 
discusses why they cannot rise to the level of a genuine dialogue. 
III 
THE MEASURE OF DIALOGUE 
A. Authenticity and Genuineness 
What makes dialogues authentic and distinct from conversations is 
the genuine recognition of “the other” by each participant to the 
dialogic event.132 A genuine dialogue is a conversation of change,133 
a “focused conversation,”134 a purposeful communicative act,135 and 
an “interlocutionary process”136 that requires the other for its own 
existence. As Martin Buber wrote, an authentic dialogue “derives its 
genuineness only from the consciousness of the element of 
 
132 Dialogue comes from the Greek word “dialogos.” Logos means “the word” and dia 
means “through.” PER LINELL, RETHINKING LANGUAGE, MIND, AND WORLD 
DIALOGICALLY: INTERACTIONAL AND CONTEXTUAL THEORIES OF HUMAN SENSE-
MAKING 3 (2009). Etymologically, as David Bohm observes, dialogue means a speech 
across, between, or through two or more people. DAVID BOHM, BOHM ON DIALOGUE 6–7 
(Lee Nichol ed.,1996) [hereinafter BOHM ON DIALOGUE]. A dialogue is a practice 
between two or more people that “will make possible a flow of meaning in the whole 
group, out of which may emerge some new understanding.” Id. This Article does not treat 
dialogue as a segment of the Socratic genre revolving around speech or discussion, 
questions and answers. Dialogue, as developed and applied in antiquity, has been 
frequently used in the pedagogical sense. The Socratic Method is known to students and 
has been the subject of much academic debate. Studies on antiquity show that the 
pioneering Socratic method, elenchus (to examine, refute, or put to shame) “is a method 
which lends itself to the dialogue because it requires that at least two voices be heard.” 
KENNETH SEESKIN, DIALOGUE AND DISCOVERY: A STUDY IN SOCRATIC METHOD 1 
(1987); see also NIKULIN, supra note 23, at 1–37 (analyzing the evolution of dialogue in 
antiquity). This Article applies dialogue qua meaning, not qua method, to explain the 
creative process. 
133 Patrick M. Jenlink, The Power of Dialogue in Social Systems, in DIALOGUE AS A 
COLLECTIVE MEANS OF DESIGN CONVERSATION 51, 53 (Patrick M. Jenlink & Bela H. 
Banathy eds., 2008). 
134 Patricia Romney, The Art of Dialogue, CLARK U. DIFFICULT DIALOGUES, 
http://www.clarku.edu/difficultdialogues/pdfs/art_of_dialogue.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 
2016). 
135 MILLER, supra note 114, at 14 (asserting that “talk is generally purposeful whereas 
conversation is not”). 
136 Swearingen, supra note 26, at 68. 
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inclusion.”137 Therefore, what defines a dialogue as such is the fact 
that the other is integral to the process and is seen as it wants to be 
seen. From this mutual relation, the dialogic experience emerges.138 
The sociology of dialogue conveys connecting and interacting in 
society. In dialogues, parties suspend “personal opinions and 
judgments” in order “to listen deeply,” understand each other, and 
create a community through verbal and silent social transactions.139 
Parties to a dialogue create mutual commitments.140 Never a solitary 
act, a dialogue connects the thoughts and knowledge of individuals 
and uses these qualities “to transform existing beliefs as well as create 
new innovations and cultural artifacts.”141 That is, dialogue is both “a 
relation that we create and sustain by conjoint agreement and through 
shared discourse” and a mechanism for creating culture by virtue of 
connecting the subjective individual consciousness with the socially 
 
137 MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 97 (Maurice Friedman ed., Ronald 
Gregor Smith trans., 1965) [hereinafter BETWEEN MAN AND MAN]. Friedman defines two 
additional types of quasi-dialogue: technical dialogue and fake dialogue. Maurice 
Friedman, Introduction to MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN xi, xiii–xiv (Ronald 
Gregor Smith trans., Maurice Friedman ed., 1965). Technical dialogue is akin to a simple 
conversation because it “is prompted solely by the need of objective understanding.” 
BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 137, at 22. Such dialogue is a “monologue 
disguised as dialogue.” Id. 
138 BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 137, at 22 (“There is genuine dialogue – no 
matter whether spoken or silent – where each of the participants really has in mind the 
other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of 
establishing a living mutual relation between himself and them.”). Martin Friedman, a 
scholar of Buber’s ontology dialogue, argues that a genuine dialogue is where the 
uniqueness of the person is secured. Martin Friedman, Dialogue of Touchstones: An 
Approach to Communication and Identity, 2 COMM. 143, 152 (1976) (“The proper 
understanding of dialogue includes uniqueness; for it is only in uniqueness that there is 
real mutuality, presentness, and presence. Dialogue means a mutual sharing in reciprocal 
presentness of the unique.”). 
139 Patrick M. Jenlink & Bela H. Banathy, Dialogue and Designing Our Future: 
Conversation as Culture Creating and Consciousness Evolving, in DIALOGUE AS A 
COLLECTIVE MEANS OF DESIGN CONVERSATION 159, 161 (Patrick M. Jenlink & Bela H. 
Banathy eds., 2008). In the words of Banathy and Jenlink, dialogue is best defined as a 
culturally and historically specific form of social discourse accomplished through 
the use of language and verbal transactions. It suggests community, mutuality 
and authenticity – an egalitarian relationship. So understood, dialogue provides a 
meeting ground, communitas, and manifests itself in a variety of spontaneous and 
ritual modes of discourse in which nature and structure meet. 
Id. at 159. 
140 Douglas Watson, Commitment, Types of Dialogue, and Fallacies, 14 INFORMAL 
LOGIC 93 (1993) (asking “[w]hat is commitment in dialogue? Is it a state of mind? Or is it 
an inference to be drawn from what you say and how you act when you are interacting 
with another participant in a social situation?”). 
141 Jenlink & Banathy, supra note 139, at 160. 
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institutionalized structure of society, which allows for cross-cultural 
communication and learning.142 Dialogue, as a relational act, 
transforms the isolated being from an autonomous to a 
communicative entity.143 It renews the participant by virtue of his 
social exposure and his affiliation to others. 
Copyright principles restrict the exclusive ownership of creative 
works. As a mechanism intended to protect dialogical opportunities 
when actors’ voices cannot win a right or remedy equal to their 
contribution, copyright attempts to alleviate the imbalance between 
owners and users. Although the law provides distributional 
mechanisms for face-to-face dialogues (like in Artists in Dialogue),144 
for example, in the form of joint ownership,145 it fails to reward, 
protect or recognize the role of the silent, ubiquitous contributor—the 
other—in copyrighted enterprises. This Part aims to contour the 
normative boundaries of how a genuine dialogue applicable to 
copyright should be defined.146 It examines the thinking of three 
dominant philosophical authorities on dialogism: Russian literary 
philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, quantum physicist David Bohm, and 
philosopher Martin Buber. The way dialogism evolved in 
contemporary theories of social relations, the cultural life of 
 
142 Id. 
143 NIKULIN, supra note 23, at 141 (arguing that dialogue “transform[s] the individual 
from a closed, self-sustaining, and isolated subject to a dialogical person”). 
144 See Artists in Dialogue, supra note 7. 
145 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a) (2012). 
146 For notable works on dialogue as a unique form of conversation and social 
discourse, see MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 1958) 
(examining the essence of dialogue from the I-It to an I-Thou presence in interhuman 
relations); NICHOLAS C. BURBULES, DIALOGUE IN TEACHING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 19 
(1993) (contending that dialogue is “at heart a kind of social relation that engages its 
participants”); Friedman, supra note 138, at 143 (arguing that a genuine dialogue is 
achievable only when the participants are vulnerable and allow a true expression of their 
inner values, identity, and uniqueness); PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 
(Myra Bergman Ramon trans., 1970) (emphasizing the importance of dialogue for 
education, freedom, and liberation); PATRICK DE MARÉ ET AL., KOINONIA: FROM HATE, 
THROUGH DIALOGUE, TO CULTURE IN THE LARGE GROUP (1991) (arguing that a dialogue 
requires externalization of internal processes in order to address wrong cultural practices. 
In support of their position, they employ the Greek concept of Koinonia, according to 
which a good dialogue is premised on impersonal fellowship rather than personal 
friendship); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 66 (David E. 
Linge ed. & trans., 1976) (asserting that the dialogical relation “carries away” its 
participants because “one enters into a dialogue with another person and then is carried 
along further by the dialogue” to explore insights unknown to him prior to the dialogical 
event). 
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democracies, and the construction of selves and creative artifacts 
owes much to these three authorities. 
B. A Continuum of Voices 
1. Utterances and Meaning 
For Mikhail Bakhtin, the place of the other in cultural meaning-
making is best explained through the polyphony of art and literature 
and the cumulative nature of cultural creativity.147 According to 
Bakhtin, it is impossible to understand the literary text of Dostoevsky, 
or other writers and authors, from a traditional authorial/monological 
point of view.148 A true understanding requires attention to the other, 
that is, to the dialogical. The other can be either a present individual 
whose reactions are addressed by the speaker or the “generalized 
other”149—the image of an imaginary audience.150 For Bakhtin, the 
idea behind “private craftsmanship” is impossible because it both 
perpetuates misunderstandings about the true nature of creative 
works, monologism, language, and the effective impact of 
historicities and fallaciously grounds assumptions about the 
transcendental ego and the inner construction of the self.151 
A basic concern that guides Bakhtin is meaning. According to 
Bakhtin, meaning does not descend from authority to society but 
instead emerges from a continuous dialogue between the speaker and 
the other. Dialogue is always in the “process of creation, never 
 
147 See generally MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 
(Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981) [hereinafter 
BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION]; MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, SPEECH GENRES AND 
OTHER LATE ESSAYS 7 (Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., Vern W. McGee trans., 
1986) [hereinafter BAKHTIN, SPEECH GENRES] (asserting that “our real exterior can be 
seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space and 
because they are others”). Bakhtin’s work is helpful in understanding not only the way in 
which communities may intervene and counter the dominance of a particular institution 
(including intellectual property law), but also the actions and collaborations of users in the 
making of knowledge. GIBSON, supra note 27, at 135. 
148 Id. 
149 This term was coined by Mead who holds that “[t]he attitude of the generalized 
other is the attitude of the whole community.” GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, Play, the Game 
and the Generalized Other, in MIND SELF AND SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A 
SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST § 20, at 154 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1934). Every socially-
organized group has common meanings that allow members of the group to communicate 
and to form social relations. Id. 
150 TZVETAN TODOROV, MIKHAIL BAKHTIN: THE DIALOGICAL PRINCIPLE, in 13 
THEORY AND HISTORY OF LITERATURE 1, 43 (Wlad Godzich trans., 1984). 
151 BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 147, at 269. 
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completed.”152 Communicative acts can have meaning if understood 
as a relational continuum. Every utterance, or “the actual 
communicative interaction in its real situation,”153 is relational 
because it exists in relation to other utterances,154 reflects a myriad of 
diverse and conflicting voices (heteroglossia),155 and presents “a 
process in which [people] oppose or dialogically interlaminate each 
other.”156 Utterances are constructions saturated with the voices of 
others,157 and as such, every utterance can never be a “single-voiced 
vehicle for expression.”158 Thus, literary and artistic works—as 
historical imprints of utterances, social relations, and cultural 
takings—are not monological constructs. 
Expressions exist only if they have meaning. This is why “selves” 
display a “drive to meaning.”159 A self cannot be examined as a 
psychologically isolated organism because “[m]eaning 
(communication) implies community.”160 The place of the other is 
not passive; it goes to the essence of the speaker’s role by making an 
 
152 COOMBE, supra note 27, at 83. 
153 SIMON DENTITH, BAKHTINIAN THOUGHT: AN INTRODUCTORY READER 3 (1995). It 
should be noted that the role of the individual is not diminished and that “dialogue with 
another . . . does not invite us to cancel what historically separates us but rather to 
understand other’s historical specificity as fully as possible.” Id. 
154 BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 147, at 354. 
155 Id. (almost every utterance displays “an intense interaction and struggle between 
one’s own and another’s word”). 
156 Id. Bakhtin further elaborates on this aspect in MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF 
DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS 37 (Caryl Emerson ed. & trans., 1984) [hereinafter BAKHTIN, 
PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS]. Here, Bakhtin argues that Dostoevsky does not 
present authorial surplus of meaning but rather displays a deep dialogic experience of 
human thought. Id. An authorial idea begins its social life “only when it enters into 
genuine dialogical relationship with the ideas of others, ideas embodied in someone else’s 
voice. The idea does not reside in a person’s head but in dialogic communion . . . .” 
Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogue of Voices and the 
Word that is Spoken, in DIALOGUE AS A MEANS OF COLLECTIVE COMMUNICATION 29, 38 
(Bela H. Banathy & Patrick M. Jenlink eds., 2005). 
157 In an utterance, “language always registers not only the subjectivities of its speaker 
and its intended addressee but also the historical traces of the repeated and varying 
appropriations of words by individuals who are socially constituted.” Nancy Glazener, 
Dialogic Subversion: Bakhtin, the Novel and Gertrude Stein, in BAKHTIN AND CULTURAL 
THEORY 156 (Ken Hirschkop & David G. Shepherd eds., 2001). 
158 BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 147, at 355. Because Bakhtin’s 
presupposition that a voice is open in the sense of representing “a whole plurality of 
interlocutors: speakers and listeners,” then “a single, separate and isolated voice is 
impossible, because the voice needs to be directed toward, and heard by, the other.” 
NIKULIN, supra note 23, at 39–40. 
159 COOMBE, supra note 27, at 83. 
160 TODOROV, supra note 150, at 30. 
ZEMER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  10:19 AM 
2016] Dialogical Transactions 175 
utterance a product of the interaction of the interlocutors. Meaning is 
a result of responding and addressing and sometimes of fierce 
conflicts between competing interests or ideals.161 Indeed, meaning, 
as it implies community, can be understood in the context of 
addressivity, which in turn dictates, “I am an event, the event of 
constantly responding to utterances from the different worlds I pass 
through.”162 Further, that I consume and internalize signs brought 
from outside of the self and I respond to these signs with signs: 
“[m]eaning comes about in both the individual psyche and in shared 
social experiences through the medium of the sign, for in both spheres 
understanding comes as a response to a sign with a sign.”163 This 
implies that every meaning is coauthored, that every word uttered by 
one person belongs in part to another. 
Bakhtin’s uses of dialogism offer much to inform critical studies 
on authorship and copyright, especially of literary texts. Copyright 
scholars Rosemary Coombe, Carys Craig, and Johanna Gibson were 
inspired and influenced by Bakhtin and developed theories 
explicating the struggle between ownership and culture. They found 
that Bakhtin’s approach is particularly relevant to contemporary 
copyright discourses because, rather than explaining intellectual 
creation as a juridical account regulated by a system of rules, 
Bakhtin’s approach urges us to see it as a replica of a progressive 
social institution that grows indefinitely. This institution requires the 
presence of others for the sake of creating meaning that was not 
imposed on the community by one dominant institution/voice. 
Bakhtin, as Coombe explains, 
focuses attention upon the historical actuality of its continuous 
evolution, the particularities of the multiple social contexts in which 
the signs that surround us are enunciated, the inequalities between 
those who have resources to speak and those who must speak the 
languages of other, and the conflicts and antagonisms around 
meaning that are generated in such conditions.164 
 
161 In musical parodies, for example, the meaning is a result of the conflict between the 
original text and the parodied text. Andrey V. Denisov, The Parody Principle in Musical 
Art, 46 INT’L REV. AESTHETICS & SOC. MUSIC 55, 63 (2015). Denisov observed that a 
parody is not a simple response to another’s voice, but the result of a “battle between two 
voices.” Id. 
162 MICHAEL HOLQUIST, DIALOGISM: BAKHTIN AND HIS WORLD 48 (1990). 
163 Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
164 COOMBE, supra note 27, at 83–84. 
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This historical and progressive notion of dialogism is, for Bakhtin, 
the novel’s hallmark.165 Bakhtin writes, “the speech of another is 
introduced into the author’s discourse (the story) in a concealed form   
. . .” and “this is not just another’s speech in the same ‘language’ – it 
is another’s utterance in a language that is itself ‘other’ to the author 
as well . . . .”166 The place of the other emerges from Bakhtin’s vision 
of meaning as a multiplicity of voices.167 This multiplicity gives the 
novel its meaning and social status. Bakhtin’s vision of dialogism 
explains the presence of many languages at work in one community, a 
reality that aims to “interrupt the possibility of a major and dominant 
language becoming entrenched as the sole means of relations between 
individuals in that community.”168 
2. The Carnival and the Public Domain 
Laws regulating intellectual creations tend to strengthen corporate 
power and lack an understanding of the role of the other in works of 
authorship. These laws “declare the author the victor,”169 treating 
creators as “the moral heroes of copyright,”170 and explain why 
Bakhtin’s obsession with the concept of carnival, where the center 
and periphery interact, is invaluable for discourses on intellectual 
property.171 Bakhtin’s concept of carnival shakes up the authoritative 
and official versions of language and values in a way that makes room 
for a multiplicity of voices and meanings. Bakhtin’s carnival explains 
his resistance to the dominance of the “official” in cultures and claims 
a place for a plurality of linguistic voices that “allows us to see the 
social significance of discourse and the relational nature of every 
utterance.”172 Carnival, for Bakhtin, is a means to display otherness 
by dismantling the hegemonic role of official voices.173 In carnival, 
 
165 See BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 147, at 259–422. 
166 Id. at 303. 
167 See NIKULIN, supra note 23, at 39 (“Every voice that speaks is meant to be heard, 
and every voice that is heard is meant to be responded to, and thus every voice craves 
dialogue.”). 
168 GIBSON, supra note 27, at 130. 
169 Peter Johnson, Can You Quote Donald Duck?: Intellectual Property in 
Cyberculture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 451, 467 (2013) (reviewing COOMBE, supra note 
26). 
170 Michael Spence, Rogers v. Koons: Copyright and the Problem of Artistic 
Appropriation, in THE TRIALS OF ART 213 (Daniel McClean ed., 2007). 
171 See generally DENTITH, supra note 153, at 39. 
172 CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, supra note 13, at 39. 
173 See, e.g., Anqi Hu, Copycatting Culture Study: A Perspective of Bakhtin’s Carnival 
Theory, 7 J. CAMBRIDGE STUD. 120 (2012). 
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laughter and comic rituals temporarily replace the seriousness and 
hierarchies of official and religious life.174 Carnivals suggest the 
absence of theatre-like footlights,175 “a change from principles of 
stability and closure to constant possibility” where “nothing is fixed       
. . . , and everything is in a state of becoming.”176 The carnival, as a 
scene for change, re-invigorates the public arena. It “belongs to the 
whole people, it is universal . . . .”177 As such, a carnivalesque setting 
shares features of both the State of Nature, where each individual is 
free to react and change,178 and the public domain in copyright, where 
each individual can use, manipulate, and adjust, unlimited ideas and 
unprotectable resources.179 
In the Renaissance and Middle Ages, tensions between the 
dominant and lower classes spawned a carnivalesque subculture in 
which sacred symbols associated with the Church and the feudal 
system were made part of the secular festivity.180 Lower classes 
searched for relief from the rigidity of the rules of the dominant.181 
This brought them to live a “second life outside officialdom”182 
through a “boundless world of humorous forms and manifestations 
[that] opposed the official and the serious tone of medieval 
 
174 MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, RABELAIS AND HIS WORLD 7, 66, 90 (Hélène Iswolsky trans., 
1984) [hereinafter BAKHTIN, RABELAIS] (“The basis of laughter which gives form to 
carnival rituals frees them completely from all religious and ecclesiastic dogmatism, from 
all mysticism and piety.”). 
175 Id. at 7. 
176 Shanti Elliot, Carnival and Dialogue in Bakhtin’s Poetics of Folklore, 30 
FOLKLORE F. 129, 130 (1999). 
177 BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS, supra note 156, at 128. 
178 John Locke defined the State of Nature as a “State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of 
Licence, though Man in that State have an uncontrollable Liberty, to dispose of his Person 
or Possessions . . . . “ JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 270–71 (Peter 
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1988) (1689) (emphasis added). 
179 See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of 
the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 68 (2003); David Lange, Reimagining 
the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 476 (2003) (arguing that the public 
domain in copyright is “an affirmative source of entitlements” capable of thwarting “the 
encroachments upon the creative imagination threatened by intellectual property”); 
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1788 (2002) 
(arguing that the public domain is a commons that is “within the reach of members of the 
relevant community without the permission of anyone else”). See generally Jessica 
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (discussing the resources that the 
public domain must protect). 
180 BAKHTIN, RABELAIS, supra note 174, at 4. 
181 Id. at 4–6. 
182 Id. at 6. 
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ecclesiastical and feudal culture.”183 All carnivalesque figures and 
activity, which were partly tolerated by the Church,184 were present: 
clowns, fools, giants and jugglers, parodies, and comic cults 
expressing nonconformist, liberating, and even rebellious views.185 
Carnival marks “the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, 
norms, and prohibitions.”186 Bakhtin contrasts feasts of the Middle 
Ages with carnivals, in that the former were formal, official, and 
complete.187 Middle Age feasts were “monolithically serious,”188 
with laughter ever absent. Conversely, a carnival is a communal feast 
where people experience their second life. A carnival allows an 
attendee to enter the “utopian realm of community, freedom, equality 
and abundance.”189 From the carnival, Bakhtin borrows flexible 
values of “becoming,” “changing,” and “incompleteness” for his 
theory on dialogism.190 He uses obscene and grotesque images—
”open unfinished” images191—to explain the nature of “becoming,” 
as opposed to pre-determined official orders and tendencies and to 
show that dialogism disrupts hegemonic practices and uniformity of 
thought. As Shanti Elliot explains, “‘Dialogic’ discourse, like the 
image of carnival activity, responds and moves; like the open and 
incomplete carnival body, it is always growing and always open to 
other words.”192 
Folk culturists have applied Bakhtin’s concept of carnivalization to 
explain cultural phenomena. Roberto DaMatta writes that in a 
carnival setting, “everything is ‘sung.’ Song, indeed, is the form of 
participation that is possible and legitimate. Through singing simple 
songs, everybody becomes equal and understands each other.”193 
 
183 Id. at 4. 
184 Id. at 14. 
185 As Lior Barshack explains, “[t]he most striking feature of the carnivalesque mode is 
the fading away of the interior and private realms” where participants “are liberated from 
the burden of human psychology and reduced to their outward aspects.” Lior Barshack, 
Intimate Enunciations: Carnival and Apocalypse in Fellini, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 
1020 (2010). 
186 BAKHTIN, RABELAIS, supra note 174, at 10. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 9. 
189 Id. Carnival is the “true feast of time, the feast of becoming, change, and renewal. It 
was hostile to all that was immortalized and completed.” Id. at 10. 
190 Id. at 10, 26, 83. 
191 Id. at 281, 317. 
192 Elliot, supra note 176, at 133. 
193 ROBERTO DAMATTA, CARNIVALS, ROGUES, AND HEROES 110 (John Drury ed., 
1991). 
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Singing is an event of utmost freedom—in contrast to anti-Bakhtin’s 
restrained feasts of the Middle Ages—where “it is not an obligatory 
event that requires certain clothes, motions or attitudes, or the 
participation of all Brazilians.”194 It is an event that “marks a 
transitory moment when the ethic of ‘everything is possible’ comes 
into being.”195 DaMatta contrasts the Brazilian carnival with New 
Orleans’ Mardi Gras.196 While the former displays a Bakhtinian 
festivity of “becoming,” about the latter DaMatta writes, “on the ritual 
level, the Carnival of New Orleans seems to reproduce the deeper 
truths of class exclusivism.”197 It is a spectacle with a climax—not an 
unfinished, unclosed parade.198 
Festivities include open and closed parades. A parade confined to a 
particular theme and message allows the organizer to exercise his 
autonomy to choose the preferred theme of the parade. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held, if a parade does not act as a tool to “silence 
the voice of competing speakers,” the choice of a theme does not 
amount to an imposition of official constraints by the State or private 
speakers.199 The parade organizers do not “forfeit constitutional 
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to 
edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject 
matter of the speech.”200 The Court remarked, “parades are public 
dramas of social relations, and in them performers define who can be 
a social actor and what subjects and ideas are available for 
communication and consideration.”201 Perhaps a real parade shares 
some features of a carnival. For example, “[s]pectators line the 
streets; people march in costumes and uniforms, carrying flags and 
banners with all sorts of messages . . . ; marching bands and pipers 
play; floats are pulled along; and the whole show is broadcast over 
 
194 Roberto DaMatta, A Concise Reflection on the Brazilian Carnival, in AESTHETICS 
IN PERFORMANCE: FORMATIONS OF SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION AND EXPERIENCE 183, 
186 (Angela Hobart & Bruce Kapferer eds., 2005); cf. Richard Schechner, Carnival 
(Theory) After Bakhtin, in CARNIVAL: CULTURE IN ACTION—THE TRINIDAD EXPERIENCE 
3, 4 (Milla Cozart Riggio ed., 2004) (“Trinidad Carnival actually both critiques official 
culture and supports it. It is an event both ‘of the people’ and ‘of the nation.’”). 
195 DaMatta, supra note 194, at 183. 
196 DAMATTA, supra note 193, at 127–31. 
197 Id. at 129. 
198 Id. 
199 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 578 
(1995) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994)). 
200 Id. at 569−70. 
201 Id. at 568 (quoting SUSAN G. DAVIS, PARADES AND POWER: STREET THEATRE IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 6 (1986)). 
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Boston television.”202 However, like Mardi Gras, a parade in Boston 
that represents a dialogue with a defined and thematic closure, is not a 
carnival. 
The carnivalesque mode explains how current intellectual property 
laws exceed their defining objectives.203 These laws enclose the 
development of cultural meaning and accept the official as dictating 
the limits of cultural environments.204 Authors and artists, corporate 
players, and other owners of cultural objects seem to have replaced 
the Church and institutions of the feudal system. They have become 
the center of cultural power controlling the way meaning evolves and 
determining degrees of exposure to symbols and signs—the defining 
properties of the collective. Principles of copyright law attest to these 
observations. For example, the duration of copyright offers owners 
spaces free of carnivalesque uses of their texts and monuments for a 
long time.205 Copyright systems struggle to overcome this outcome 
through doctrines such as the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
to secure users some rights and to allow for a carnivalesque 
experience even during the time the work is under copyright 
protection. 
Though, in theory, users can consume an unlimited number of 
ideas or ridicule protractible expressions in the course of fair use, in 
practice, these uses are limited. The “incredibly shrinking” doctrine of 
fair use206 and the growth in information feudalism207 explain why 
users’ carnivalesque experiences have been reduced to remote 
expectations. In feudal systems, the Church was entrenched in the 
spiritual and practical lives of medieval peasants. In copyright 
systems, members of the public—who attach cultural value to 
commodified information and create and nurture spaces for dialogic 
exchange where copyrighted works receive new meanings—are 
spiritually affected by the closure of access to these objects. Their 
practical lives are also affected. For example, they are unable to use 
and enjoy copyrighted materials, advance in certain professions, or 
 
202 Id. at 569. 
203 COOMBE, supra note 27, at 85–86. 
204 See infra Part V. 
205 See sources cited supra note 18. 
206 See Symposium, Fair Use: ‘Incredibly Shrinking’ or Extraordinarily Expanding, 31 
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 571 (2008). 
207 PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS 
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG 
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY 267 (2004). 
ZEMER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  10:19 AM 
2016] Dialogical Transactions 181 
contribute to innovation.208 The peasants likely believed their futures 
were secured through hard work. In contemporary times, members of 
the public labor for the maintenance and regeneration of the public 
domain and contribute, as partners, to the creative process and the 
execution of creative expressions. As the following Parts demonstrate, 
irrespective of new information markets that facilitate strong 
exchange of information, copyright in modern times secures for 
members of the public the same security that many peasants enjoyed 
in feudal systems: starvation and a public domain depleted of its 
constituent properties much akin to a closed parade. 
C. Continuum of Struggles 
Dialogue is about subjects interacting. The individual comes into 
being when he relates to the other. This proposition guided Martin 
Buber in his classic work I and Thou.209 The opening sentence of the 
book announces Buber’s departure from prevailing philosophical 
holdings. “To man,” he writes, “the world is twofold in accordance 
with his twofold attitude.”210 These two folds are the pairs of 
relationships: “I-It” and “I-Thou.”211 Rather than relating to the world 
 
208 In June 2013, the international community signed The Marrakesh Treaty to 
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or 
Otherwise Print Disabled (available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/marrakesh/). The 
Treaty does not address all the difficulties of disabled people to accessing copyrighted 
material. One Irish Report explained that the lack of access rights to the disabled does not 
only “curtail the life chances of a great many people who are unable . . . to access and 
enjoy the full range of cultural materials. Moreover, it reduced the contribution they can 
make, both in general to society, and in particular to innovation . . . .” THE COPYRIGHT 
REVIEW COMMITTEE, MODERNISING COPYRIGHT: THE REPORT OF THE COPYRIGHT 
REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JOBS, ENTERPRISE AND INNOVATION 66 
(2013) [hereinafter MODERNISING COPYRIGHT], https://www.djei.ie/en/Publications 
/Publication-files/CRC-Re port.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2016). 
209 BUBER, supra note 146. Buber had a worldwide influence and inspired eminent 
intellectuals such as Albert Camus, Albert Einstein, T.S. Elliot, and Franz Kafka. Rob 
Anderson & Kenneth N. Cissna, Martin Buber: Bearing Witness to an Experience, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES IN THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATION 127, 131 (Hannah Jason 
ed., 2012); see also Ruth Birnbaum, The Uniqueness of Martin Buber, 40 MOD. AGE 389 
(1998). 
210 BUBER, supra note 146. 
211 Bakhtin was also influenced by Buber. In an interview quoted in The New York 
Review of Books, he called Buber “the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century.” 
Quoted in Friedman, supra note 156, at 30; see also Anderson & Cissna, supra note 209, 
at 137–39 (discussing Buber’s influence within the communication discipline). Bakhtin 
saw the “I” as emerging from intimate social encounters with otherness. Friedman, supra 
note 156, at 31 (“In exact parallel to Buber’s contrast between I-Thou and I-It, dialogue 
and monologue, Bakhtin defines ‘monologism’ as the denial of the existence outside 
oneself of ‘another I with equal rights (thou).’”). For both Bakhtin and Buber, a dialogue is 
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in a solely subject-object relation (“I-It”), man is capable of an “I-
Thou” relationship, which is direct, mutual, present, and open. 
Although the “It” is necessary, he who lives with “It” alone is not a 
man.212 Man begins in union and then separates to I-It and back to I-
Thou.213 Ontologically, Buber believed that there is an inborn Thou 
within each person, which unfolds in our relationship with the 
other.214 If we take the other as an It we will not be able to unfold the 
inborn Thou. From this unfolding, we can make sense of and 
understand the other. Legal scholars have used the concept of I-Thou 
to explain the role of the other in taking mutual events seriously.215 
This does not depend on “one letting himself go before another, but 
on his granting to the man to whom he communicates himself a share 
in his being.”216 Thus, for Buber, “I-Thou” is the realm of 
interpersonal, interhuman, or dialogical relations. Maurice Freedman, 
Buber’s biographer and prominent follower, explains, “Only I-Thou 
gives meaning to the world of It, for I-Thou is an end which is not 
reached in time but is there from the start, originating and carrying 
through.”217 
Buber distinguishes among three different levels of dialogue.218 
First, there exists genuine dialogue.219 This rare and infrequent level 
occurs when “each of the participants really has in mind the other or 
 
an inter- and intra-related web of voices. For both, authentic human life requires “open-
ended dialogue.” Id. 
212 BUBER, supra note 144, at 17 (“Man can live continuously and securely in the world 
of It, but if he only lives in this world he is not a man.”). 
213 As one commentator explains, 
The process of becoming, as proposed by Buber, is the movement between the 
attitude of I-Thou to I-It and back to I-Thou. The beginning relational level is the 
relationship of union. Man begins in union, then separates in order to grasp the 
world of objects, institutions, abstractions and accumulated knowledge . . . . 
BERNARD J. FLEURY, WHAT IS MAN? MALE AND FEMALE 86 (2011). 
214 BUBER, supra note 146, at 17. 
215 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Law as Rationalization: Getting Beyond Reason to 
Business Ethics, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 959, 1008−14 (2006) (applying Buber’s I-Thou 
relations to business law and ethics and noting that Buber’s ideal requires us to be attentive 
to the reality of the other in business situations); see also Ronit Zamir, Can Mediation 
Enable the Empowerment of Disadvantaged Groups? A Narrative Analysis of Consensus-
Building in Israel, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 193 (2011) (using the I-Thou to explain that 
the role of dialogue is to undermine hegemonic voices and to see the uniqueness of 
participants to a negotiation, especially when one group is disadvantaged). 
216 BUBER, supra note 146, at 77. 
217 MAURICE  S. FRIEDMAN, MARTIN BUBER: THE LIFE OF DIALOGUE 67 (Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1955). 
218 Anderson & Cissna, supra note 209, at 134–35. 
219 Id. 
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others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the 
intention of establishing a living mutual relationship between himself 
and them.”220 The second level is technical dialogue, which occurs 
when people reciprocate in understanding each other, such as exists 
between coworkers or strangers seeking directions.221 Such dialogues 
are low-level, verbal exchanges.222 They serve as social conduits for 
general information, as in Darwish’s first circle of interaction223 or, in 
Hume’s terms, for pleasure conveyed through conversation.224 The 
third level is a monologue disguised as a dialogue.225 This level 
includes “a conversation in which someone seeks only to make a 
particular impression on the other.”226 It is not a close conversation, 
not even as understood by De Quincey.227 Nor is it a social activity as 
depicted by Hazlitt.228 A monologue under these terms is a solitary 
and exclusionary experience in the sense that “the focus is more on 
the self than on one’s partner.”229 Buber provides as an example a 
debate in which the speakers do not regard each other as persons and 
“need neither to communicate something, nor to learn some-thing, nor 
to influence someone, nor to come into connexion with someone, but 
solely by the desire to have one’s own self-reliance confirmed by 
marking the impression that is made . . . .”230 Buber recognizes the 
need for monological experiences but fears that this has become the 
frequent and prevailing, rather than the occasional, mode of 
communication.231 
 
220 BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 137, at 19. This relates to one of the basic 
elements in Buber’s conception of dialogue: confirmation. An awareness of the other as 
unique and whole necessitate turning to the other in the sense of confirming the other. 
Buber noted: “In human society at all its levels, persons confirm one another in a practical 
way to some extent or other in their personal qualities and capacities, and a society may be 
termed human in the measure to which its members confirm one another.” MARTIN 
BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN: SELECTED ESSAYS 67 (Maurice Friedman ed., 
Maurice Friedman & Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 1988). 
221 Anderson & Cissna, supra note 209, at 134–35. 
222 Id. 
223 See DARWISH, supra note 74, at 186. 
224 See HUME, supra note 116. 
225 Anderson & Cissna, supra note 209, at 134–35. 
226 Id. at 135. 
227 See supra notes 116–17. 
228 See supra notes 119–20. 
229 Anderson & Cissna, supra note 209, at 135. 
230 BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 137, at 22–23. 
231 RONALD C. ARNETT, COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY: IMPLICATIONS OF 
MARTIN BUBER’S DIALOGUE 77 (Yvonne D. Mattson ed., 1986). 
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Although the first level of dialogue can occur surprisingly in “all 
kinds of odd corners” it is, Buber writes, a rare occasion.232 This 
Article argues that a genuine dialogue in the realm of copyrighted 
commodities is not as rare as it may be in other social realms. A 
genuine dialogue, defined according to the first level, is fundamental 
to creative expressions in which one’s cultural and social experiences 
are combined with one’s monological properties. Every copyrighted 
enterprise establishes “a living mutual relation” between the author or 
artist and others.233 Because “the life of dialogue is the turning 
towards the other,”234 and because authorial and artistic works require 
dialogical resources to emerge, formalize, and generate meaning to be 
understood by the audience, a monological view of copyright that 
overemphasizes the authorial self and strengthens an author’s 
exclusive rights is socially and legally wrong. 
The interhuman life of a dialogue is impeded by various factors. 
These factors include ignoring the other by imposing one’s own 
views, denying the other’s presence, and failing to perceive him as he 
wishes to be perceived.235 Buber’s distinction between imposing and 
unfolding explains these impediments. The former denotes 
communicative relations where one has no interest in the reality of the 
other, while the latter refers to a genuine dialogue in which one 
contributes to the process of the unfolding of the other.236 An 
individualistic approach to copyright hinders the interhuman life of 
creative dialogues by virtue of providing authors exclusive rights to 
control their creative expressions, ignoring the role of the other in the 
creative process, and imposing on the public only limited access 
rights that in turn restrict fundamental interhuman relations necessary 
for the creative progress. 
 
232 BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 137, at 22. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 25. Turning towards the other has a temporal dimension as well. Buber 
referred specifically to “dialogical moments.” Martin Buber, Replies to My Critics, in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN BUBER 689, 692 (Paul Arthur Schilpp & Maurice Friedman eds., 
1967). He even refers to “genuine dialogic moments.” Id. Cissna and Anderson explain a 
dialogic moment as “the experience of inventive surprise shared by the dialogic partners as 
each ‘turns toward’ the other and both mutually perceive the impact of each other’s 
turning. It is a brief interlude of focused awareness and acceptance of otherness . . . .” 
Kenneth N. Cissna & Rob Anderson, Theorizing About Dialogic Moments: The Buber-
Rogers Position and Postmodern Themes, 8 COMM. THEORY 63, 74 (1998). 
235 BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 137, at 75–81. 
236 Id. 
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For example, the term of protection in copyright favors policies of 
exclusion and imposing rather than unfolding.237 It limits the 
evolution of creative development by enclosing the storehouse of 
cultural resources, imposing on others a duty to comply with the rules 
of exclusion, and curtailing the process of unfolding creative 
others.238 In the first modern copyright law, the initial term of 
protection was fourteen years.239 The Statute of Anne recognized a 
right of reversion should an author live after the expiration date of the 
copyright.240 The term could be renewed for another period of 
fourteen years if merited by social or economic circumstances.241 In 
the statute, the author and the interhuman aspect of creativity together 
were part of the legal bargain. Bentley and Ginsburg explain, “the 
second fourteen years should have enabled the author to grant rights 
anew from a stronger bargaining position should her work have 
earned a substantial audience.”242 Acquiring an audience substantial 
enough to secure an additional term required a wide dissemination of 
the work and, consequently, the recognition of the other—the 
audience—as the social target for the work’s communicative future. 
That recognition is possible only in the realm of the interhuman. 
To say the reality of the other plays an insignificant role in modern 
copyright is an exaggeration. Theories of freedom of expression and 
critical cultural approaches that reject the Romantic model of 
authorship rescue, protect, and give meaning to the realm of the other. 
Moreover, the recent attempt by certain jurisdictions to revise the 
definition of fair uses by introducing users’ rights243 and the 
 
237 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998). The Act was challenged in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) 
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to the CTEA). The effect of this extension is to place a 
burden on creative people. Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: 
Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 197 (2002) (discussing the extension 
of copyright and asserting that “the extension will impose strong restraints, many of whose 
negative effects will be felt by creative activities”). 
238 Boyle, supra note 179, at 33. 
239 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19, § 
2 (Gr. Brit.). 
240 Id. §§ 1, 9. 
241 Id. § 11. 
242 Lionel Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the 
Authors”: Anglo-American Authors’ Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to 
Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1479 (2010). 
243 In a landmark decision, the Canadian Supreme Court held that “[t]he fair dealing 
exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In order to maintain 
the proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not 
be interpreted restrictively.” CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 
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international success in adopting the Marrakesh Treaty244 widens the 
scope of public interest. However, the scope of these successes 
remains limited. As the first three Parts of this Article argue, many 
scholars are steadfast in their belief that current copyright laws 
devalue the place of the other and regard the owner as the most 
relevant other. In this way, copyright policies reflect Buber’s third 
level of dialogue—a monologue disguised as dialogue. A 
monological dominance in copyright impedes the development of 
creative personalities and our cultural environment and, consequently, 
may even limit our basic right to think and imagine.245 Strengthening 
the protection of the entertainment industry, limiting fair uses, or 
departing from users’ rights,246 creates a copyright culture where not 
only do the voices of others go unheard but where interhuman 
spaces—spheres in which creative thoughts and exchanges of 
meaning develop—become a fiction. Were it so, lost would be the 
ability to unfold and communicate because the laws regulating 
cultural production limit the spectrum of enjoyment and use necessary 
for any genuine interhuman/dialogical spaces. Limiting these 
interhuman/dialogical spaces and enclosing the development of 
meanings reduces creative dialogues to, at the most, conversational 
events. 
A genuine dialogue requires seeing the other qua other, that is, as 
he wishes to be seen and treated. Copyright laws protect this principle 
 
S.C.R. 339, para. 48, at 364 (Can.). In later decisions the Court continued to apply and 
develop the notion of users and rightsholders. See, e.g., Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Music Publishers of Can. v. Bell Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326, para. 15, at 334 (Can.) 
(reaffirming that research must receive a “large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure 
that users’ rights are not unduly constrained”). For more on the Canadian fair dealing 
regime after CCH, see generally Giuseppina D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A 
Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. 
Fair Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309, 319–36 (2008). 
244 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
245 Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 
YALE L.J. 1, 58 (2002) (arguing that the First Amendment protects the “freedom of 
imagination” and that a strong copyright regime imposes limitations on this freedom). 
246 The Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in CCH Canadian Ltd., 1 S.C.R. 339, was 
adopted by an Israeli District Court, which held that a person operating a Web site that 
provides video streaming of live sporting events enjoys a user’s right to provide the public 
with access to these events and therefore such person’s identity shall not be disclosed to 
the plaintiff, the Premier League. CC (TA) 11646/08 The Football Association Premier 
League Ltd. v. John Doe, Tak (3)09 8372 [2009] (by subscription, in Hebrew). However, 
on May 13, 2012, the Supreme Court of Israel rejected the doctrine of users’ rights as 
applicable to Israeli copyright law finding that the 2007 Copyright Act does not provide 
any user’s rights. CA 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Ltd. v. John Doe, 
(May 13, 2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
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too, through a set of moral rights that preserve the integrity of 
authors’ creative text its “meaning and message.”247 The private and 
social dimensions of moral rights explain their fundamentality to 
genuine dialogical experiences. Privately, a lack of protection may 
“strip the author of an important aspect of her persona, and might also 
garble or diminish the author’s attempt to communicate the nature of 
her culture to the audience.”248 Moral rights give authors the ability to 
be treated as they wish and restrict the ways in which the public can 
use or manipulate their creative works. One can license his copyright, 
but not the moral rights attached to the work. Moral rights are 
manifestations of one’s personality in one’s intellectual expressions. 
They act as barriers to expropriation of inalienable features of one’s 
personality, embedded in his artistic creations. The right of integrity, 
for example, gives an author the exclusive right to project his “soul of 
creativity.”249 The relationship between the work and the author is so 
strong that, as Kwall writes, it resembles that between “a parent and a 
child.”250 Socially, moral rights act as guardians of accurate 
information, as they give the author a “right to inform the public 
about the original nature of the artistic message and the meaning of 
her work.”251 Furthermore, because copyrighted works are products 
of the creative collectivity, the public and its creative members, which 
together hold the various roles of the other, retain a legitimate right to 
communicate with the author qua author and to access the new 
resource created with the public’s contribution. 
Moral rights ensure that every use of a work will acknowledge the 
author in his uniqueness and wholeness. The doctrine of moral rights 
requires an attitude that “encourages turning towards the other, 
imagining the reality of the other, receiving the other as partner, and 
hence confirming the other as a person.”252 This means that moral 
rights require an awareness of I-Thou, and they unfold the other in 
ways that conform with Buber’s ideal dialogue. This supports an 
argument that moral rights are better candidates for stronger 
 
247 KWALL, supra note 3, at 58. 
248 Joshua M. Daniels, Note, “Lost in Translation”: Anime, Moral Rights, and Market 
Failure, 88 B.U. L. REV. 709, 715–16 (2008); see also Edward J. Damich, The Right of 
Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 
GA. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
249 KWALL, supra note 3, at 6. 
250 Id. at XIV. 
251 Id. at 151; see also Lior Zemer, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1519, 1561–67 (2011). 
252 Anderson & Cissna, supra note 209, at 57. 
ZEMER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  10:19 AM 
188 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95, 141 
protection than economic rights in order to foster genuine dialogue 
premised on accurate information and the building of new dialogical 
routes. The social bargain in moral rights, then, ensures that the 
author, in his capacity as the other, receives protection for his 
expression and that the public receives accurate information based on 
the real message and meaning intended by the author in his expressive 
commodity. Although moral rights create some barriers to free 
dialogues,253 they feed the ground on which public dialogue can 
receive and benefit from the author’s genuine message. 
One may wrongly assume that Martin Buber, with his ideal 
approach to dialogism, was simply trying to convince us to live a 
harmonious life of dialogue and inclusion. But what Buber attempted 
to do was remind us of the “right to community that deserves our 
philosophical attention”254 by crafting a philosophical anthropology 
depicting the human experience as a continuum of struggles. It is not 
monological or dialogical, but a continuous management of the 
tension between these two polarities, which allows people to “seek 
both unity and individuation.”255 Unity in copyright requires a strong 
public domain and recognition of the role of the collective in the 
creative process. Individuation in copyright is manifested in the 
rewards authors obtain for the labor and personality they invest in a 
given work. In the copyright-making process, the author begins in 
union, then separates to I-It before returning to I-Thou. It is an 
ongoing process premised on mutuality in every act of creation. 
Indeed, if mutuality can happen, as Buber maintains, in an 
underground air-raid shelter or between two audience members 
listening to Mozart in a darkened opera house,256 then mutuality 
between creators and others in the process of creating texts and art is 
unquestionable. Martin Buber’s first level of dialogue refers to rare 
and infrequent occurrences when “each of the participants really has 
in mind the other or others in their present . . . and turns to them with 
the intention of establishing a living mutual relationship . . . .”257 
Intellectual properties are dialogical manifestations of I-Thou 
experiences. Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue invites us to 
 
253 See, e.g., Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263 (2009). 
254 Arthur S. Lothstein, To Be is to Be Relational: Martin Buber and John Dewey, in 
MARTIN BUBER AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 33, 48 (Maurice Friedman et al. eds., 1996). 
255 Anderson & Cissna, supra note 209, at 137. 
256 BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 137, at 242. 
257 Id. at 22. 
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rethink the interpersonal dimension of the creative process.258 It 
restores the notion of “we” and its place in this process.259 
D. A Continuum of Thoughts 
A theory of dialogue divergent from those of Bahktin and Buber, is 
offered by David Bohm. Bohm focuses on thought as a system aimed 
at cultural regeneration.260 In On Dialogue, Bohm presents his 
dialogical worldview, emphasizing that dialogue is an advanced mode 
of communication, a “multi-faceted process, looking well beyond 
typical notions of conversational parlance and exchange.”261 It is “a 
stream of meaning flowing among and through us and between us . . . 
out of which may emerge some new understanding.”262 Bohm 
emphasizes the “whole” in dialogue.263 Each participant in a dialogue 
contributes to the dialogic entity, and, with the parts others bring, a 
whole is created.264 A dialogue is a continuum of thoughts, an inquiry 
into the process of shaping collective thought. “Such an inquiry 
necessarily calls into question deeply held assumptions regarding 
culture, meaning and identity. In its deepest sense dialogue is an 
invitation to test the viability of traditional definitions of what it 
means to be human, and collectively to explore the prospect of an 
enhanced humanity.”265 
In dialogue, contrary to prevailing beliefs, each person does not 
make public certain ideas known to him, rather he joins another 
person in “making something in common, i.e., creating something 
new together.”266 Participants to a dialogue in this sense form a 
collective body and when a work of art or authorship is created, it is 
 
258 Birnbaum, supra note 209, at 395 (arguing that “human scientists have 
conscientiously embraced Buber’s philosophy to restore an interpersonal dimension to 
their diverse disciplines”). 
259 Id. Restoring the “we” into I-Thou interactions “will serve to guard the moral, 
material, economic, and technological essentials to sustain the core of centralization 
without destroying the communal character.” Id. 
260 NIKULIN, supra note 23, at 22 (providing that Bohm’s version of dialogue is “sui 
generis”). 
261 Peter M. Senge, Preface to BOHM ON DIALOGUE, supra note 132, at xv. 
262 BOHM ON DIALOGUE, supra note 132, at 7. 
263 Id. at 10. 
264 Id. 
265 Senge, supra note 261, at vii–viii; cf. NIKULIN, supra note 23, at 141–42 
(“[D]ialogue is not a mechanism whose primary purpose is to produce and originate 
meaning by means of negotiations, as, for instance, Bohm takes it to be.”). 
266 BOHM ON DIALOGUE, supra note 132, at 3. 
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never the expression of one person or source but an assemblage of a 
multiplicity of sources. Regarding a work of art, Bohm asks: 
Can it properly be said that the artist is expressing himself, i.e., 
literally “pushing outward” something that is already formed inside 
of him? . . . [W]hat usually happens is that the first thing the artist 
does is only similar in certain ways to what he may have in mind. 
As in a conversation between two people, he sees the similarity and 
the difference, and from this perception something further emerges 
in his next action. Thus, something new is continually created that 
is common to the artist and the material on which he is working.267 
Dialogue in Bohmian terms, then, is the place where new knowledge 
is constantly created. In discussions or conversations, participants bat 
ideas back and forth to win the game. “At best this may produce 
agreement or compromise, but it does not give rise to anything 
creative.”268 In contrast, in a dialogue, “a person may prefer a certain 
position but does not hold to it nonnegotiably.”269 Because a dialogue 
presupposes a collective thought,270 it serves as a platform for 
compromises and negotiation over knowledge and ideas. Bohm tells 
us that dialogues change both the individual and the individual’s 
relation to the outer world.271 It is what we call “communion,” or “a 
kind of participation” in the free exchange of ideas and 
information.272 
Understanding dialogue in this way may lead to new insights on 
prevalent patterns “for transforming culture and freeing it of 
destructive misinformation, so that creativity can be liberated.”273 
The essential thing is 
the presence of the spirit of dialogue, which is, in short, the ability 
to hold many points of view in suspension, along with a primary 
interest in the creation of a common meaning. It is particularly 
important, however, to explore the possibilities of dialogue in the 
context of a group that is large enough to have within it a wide 
range of view, and to sustain a strong flow of meaning.274 
 
267 Id. at 4. 
268 DAVID BOHM & F. DAVID PEAT, SCIENCE, ORDER, AND CREATIVITY 241 (2d ed. 
2000). 
269 Id. 
270 BOHM ON DIALOGUE, supra note 132, at 29. 
271 BOHM & PEAT, supra note 268, at 54. 
272 Id. at 47. 
273 BOHM & PEAT, supra note 268, at 240. 
274 Id. at 247. 
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Translated into copyright terms, copyright systems as social 
institutions require thriving dialogical sites, discursive participation, 
and closeness between individuals, groups, and networks if they are 
ever to “sustain a strong flow of meaning.”275 As Johanna Gibson 
asserts, “it is the flow of information in the network that is of critical 
interest to a re-conceptualization of the priorities of intellectual 
property systems in the context of cultural development and 
diversity.”276 Enclosure movements in copyright and other 
intellectual property laws reduce the possibility of sustaining a strong 
flow of meaning. This flow is detrimentally affected by attaching 
exclusivity to symbols, words, ideas, and other cultural artifacts that 
comprise the basic units of every dialogic community. Therefore, the 
allocation of rights in intangible works cannot be the main focal point 
of copyright laws.277 
In an interview with a Dutch artist, Louwrien Wijers, Bohm 
discussed the nature of creativity. Criticizing the Dutch understating 
of quantum mechanics, Bohm proclaimed that the underlying 
mathematics of quantum theory imply “a movement in which 
everything, any particular elements of space, may have a field which 
unfolds into the whole and the whole enfolds [the field] in it.”278 He 
has explained his vision through the example of a hologram. In 
contrast to a regular photograph, where there is a point-to-point 
correspondence between the object and the image, “in a hologram the 
entire object is contained in each region of the hologram, enfolded as 
a pattern of waves, which can then be unfolded by shining light 
through it.”279 In this example exist implicate and explicate orders. 
The enfolded, implicate order is characterized by the internal 
relatedness of every constituent, even those that seem independent in 
the explicate order.280 Bohm calls this interrelatedness mutual 




276 GIBSON, supra note 27, at 27. 
277 Abraham Drassinower, Copyright is Not About Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 108 
(2012). 
278 DAVID BOHM, BOHM ON CREATIVITY 129 (Lee Nichol ed., 1998) [hereinafter 
BOHM ON CREATIVITY]. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 130. 
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Our everyday experience of consciousness is one immediate display 
of the implicate order—thoughts and perceptions emerge, create 
actions and leave traces in the world, and then are folded back into 
consciousness, only to recur in another context or another form, 
individually and collectively . . . This mutual participation, as 
manifested in the collective consciousness of humankind, is the 
basis for Bohm’s vision of dialogue. The intention of dialogue is to 
expose the relatedness of our thought processes, and the manner in 
which we collectively generate fragmented realities through those 
thought processes.282 
This vision of dialogue, Bohm contends, applies to all aspects of life 
and disciplines.283 He finds considerable similarity between art and 
the way in which the mathematics of quantum theory works.284 “Art 
is exploring fundamentally new modes of perception, through the 
senses, and new forms of imagination”285 that emanate from the 
implicate order. Dialogue is fundamental to cultural evolution and the 
avoidance of social stagnation. It is not “an agenda but rather we fall 
into dialogue as a form of social relation.”286 The central role of 
dialogue in the attainment of stable social orders is that it brings “to 
the surface the fragmented thinking and incoherent patterns of 
thought that have constrained individual and collective growth and 
change.”287 Where culture does not develop as a dialogical enterprise, 
a “mechanical repetitious order” will take its place.288 
An earlier expression of this claim was made by John Locke, 
already aware of this risk, who wrote that adopting laws that 
perpetuate copyright in the hands of guilds of owners would create an 
imbalanced copyright system discouraging of learning and access to 
knowledge.289 In such a system, the communication and dialogical 
opportunities that feed the creative process would rarely exist. Absent 
these opportunities, low-level creative repetitions—rather than 
valuable creative works—would be created. The individual, as Locke 
contended, would act as “the topical man,” which he called the “worst 
 
282 Id. at xxxii. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 125−28. 
285 Id. at 109. 
286 Jenlink, supra note 133, at 57. 
287 Id. 
288 BOHM ON CREATIVITY, supra note 278, at 133. 
289 See John Locke, Liberty of the Press, reprinted in JOHN LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS 
329 (Mark Goldie ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) [hereinafter Locke, Liberty of the 
Press]. 
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conversation partner.”290 Also relevant to a stable copyright regime 
and the realization of dialogue as a fundamental layer in creative 
processes is a 
proper understanding of the nature of culture. It seems clear that in 
essence culture is meaning as shared in society. And here ‘meaning’ 
is not only significance, but also intention, purpose and value. It is 
clear, for example, that art, literature, science and other such 
activities of culture are all parts of the common heritage of shared 
meaning.291 
Copyright scholars challenging current expansions of the ownership 
spectrum in copyright embrace this wisdom when claiming that 
copyrighted works are built on shared meanings and collectively 
created and maintained cultural symbols. They also embrace this 
wisdom when claiming that copyright policies have become a 
powerful monological tool of owners and industry. These scholars 
view dialogue as an intersection between subsocieties and subcultures 
where interaction with, and learning from, others takes place and 
results in a societal system consisting “not of monolithic structures 
but rather of a dynamic unity within plurality.”292 It would be 
impossible to have the literary texts and inventions that we have 
without dialogical plurality because they “exceed those imagined in 
their inception.”293 Interestingly, Bohm’s ideal of creative dialogue 
recapitulates the struggles within copyright systems, with owners 
favoring monological dominance and unilaterally conditioning the 
exchange of information: 
Rather the struggle of each idea to dominate is commonly 
emphasized in most activities in society. In this struggle, the success 
of a person’s point of view may have important consequences for 
status, prestige, social position, and monetary reward. In such a 
conditioned exchange, the tacit infrastructure [of our culture], both 
individually and collectively, responds very actively to block the 
free play that is needed for creativity.294 
 
290 John Locke, Of Study, quoted in Yeo, supra note 112, at 16, 18; see also Richard 
Yeo, John Locke’s ‘Of Study’ (1677): Interpreting an Unpublished Essay, 3 LOCKE STUD. 
147 (2003). 
291 DAVID BOHM, Dialogue as a New Creative Order (1987), in THE ESSENTIAL 
DAVID BOHM 289 (Lee Nichol ed., 2003). 
292 BOHM & PEAT, supra note 264, at 242. 
293 COOMBE, supra note 26, at 134. 
294 BOHM & PEAT, supra note 268, at 243. 
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E. Three Commonalities 
Although Bakhtin, Buber, and Bohm developed different theories 
of dialogism, their commitment to a theory of genuine dialogue 
makes these differences reconcilable. This commitment is so 
fundamental to the social strength of their theories that one can find 
shared commonalities in the three theories. First, a genuine dialogue, 
as a deeper and unique act of interaction, denotes a transaction 
between individuals and society. Information and other properties 
exchanged in this transaction require reciprocity, and this will dictate 
the potential of the transaction to yield creative results. No dialogical 
transaction will be possible without reciprocity. It is a total enterprise 
in which each “person’s contributions are aligned with those of others 
. . . .”295 The evolving structure of this enterprise and its transactional 
nature are explained through Bakhtin’s insistence on the place of the 
other and the polyphony of art and literature as sites of multiple 
historical voices; through Buber’s argument on the constant 
movement between the I-It and the I-Thou, and the dominance of the 
latter; and Bohm’s concept of creation as a continuum of thoughts 
where participants are not batting ideas back and forth to beat each 
other, as in low-level interactions, but rather act together to create a 
whole. 
Second, the process of dialogue is a process of “awakening” in the 
sense that one is fully existent only in dialogue. Therefore, one must 
enter the dialogical to exist fully. Dialogue creates a free flow of 
meanings between all participants and rescues a self from solitude. 
For Bakhtin, Buber, and Bohm, dialogue is a socially constructed 
activity—it is a progressive social event. This process feeds self-
realization through knowing the limitations of individuality. Dialogue 
suspends individuals’ preconceived opinions in the quest for 
generating collectively shared meanings. It is a participatory act, an 
organized process. The individual thrives in a group that gives him 
the “unity of self.”296 For example, “in the case of such a social group 
as a ball team, the team is the generalized other in so far as it enters—
as an organized process or social activity—into the experience of any 
one of the individual members of it.”297 Systems that, through laws 
and policies, lack or disturb robust and durable dialogical platforms or 
that avoid treating the dialogical as an eminent feature in good social 
 
295 SHIBUTANI, supra note 71, at 6–7. 
296 MEAD, supra note 149, at 229. 
297 Id. 
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and creative life, produce, in Bohmian terms, “mechanical repetitious 
order,”298 under which the development of meanings, social cohesion, 
and creative selves is frustrated. 
The third commonality is the indisputable existence of a plural 
subject. While the first two commonalities recognize and justify the 
ubiquity of dialogicality and presuppose an implicit genuine social 
compact to preserve social stability, the plural subject holds collective 
commitments and joint responsibilities to preserve societal stability 
through, inter alia, vibrant discursive sites. Notably, the agreements 
and commitments we collectively share need not be made explicit. As 
Anthonie Meijers asserts, “[m]any social activities are based on prior 
explicit or implicit agreements. Such agreements bind the subsequent 
participants in various ways and are an explanatory factor in the 
subsequent collective actions. The agreement is constitutive of both 
the collective intentions and the collective agent.”299 Bakhtin, Buber, 
and Bohm do not dismiss the individual but define dialogue as a 
whole in which the individual and the public intentionally agree—
both implicitly and explicitly—to create a unitary entity. Their 
theories imply the existence of a plural subject expressing, 
metaphorically, the will of a collective mind. While Bakhtin and 
Buber apply the collective mind paradigm implicitly, Bohm explicitly 
proclaims that “there is both a collective mind and an individual 
mind, and like a stream, the flow moves between them.”300 If authors 
and artists are part of a plural agent, when consuming cultural 
properties, they move between their individual mind and the 
collective mind. The collective commitments they share obligate them 
to refrain from depleting the commons, to allow fellow authors and 
users access to newly created objects, and to leave resources for 
subsequent creations. 
Literature on plural subjects accepts the public as a collective 
entity able to work in accordance with certain conventions and values. 
Though the public lacks a human mind or a biological brain, the 
collective commitment to, and responsibility for, the preservation of 
cultural and social realities constitutes a collective intentional state. In 
 
298 BOHM ON CREATIVITY, supra note 278, at 133. 
299 Anthonie W.M. Meijers, Can Collective Intentionality Be Individualized, 62 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 167, 177 (2003). 
300 BOHM ON DIALOGUE, supra note 132, at 27. Dialogue for Bohm was concerned 
“with suspending individual preconceived opinions and with originating new ‘collectively 
shared meanings’ among the dialogue’s participants, who, thus, must not only participate 
in a collective mind, but also, in a sense, must constitute a collective body.” NIKULIN, 
supra note 23, at 23. 
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this state, the public participates in, contributes to, and controls 
certain events and processes—a collective mind uniting society. 
Margaret Gilbert argues that obligations and joint commitments are 
collective activities. She speaks of a “plural subject” that involves two 
or more subjects, which, together, create one subject.301 For Gilbert, 
“people become jointly committed by mutually expressing their 
willingness to be jointly committed, in conditions of common 
knowledge.”302 She defines “plural subject” broadly: “any set of 
jointly committed persons, whatever the content of the particular joint 
commitment in question.”303 She includes in her definition formalized 
organizations, like unions and armies, and more amorphous 
conglomerates, like “social rules and conventions, group languages, 
everyday agreements, collective beliefs and values, and genuinely 
collective emotions.”304 Gilbert’s ideal “plural subject” seems 
applicable to almost limitless social configurations, such as the group 
of authors or artists that today create in the most interconnected 
environment. This thinking exceeds the narrow definition of “a 
collection of readers”305 artists, or other interpretive communities like 
social or historical societies that share linguistic backgrounds, 
 
301 MARGARET GILBERT, LIVING TOGETHER: RATIONALITY, SOCIALITY, AND 
OBLIGATION 187 (1996). The concepts of a plural subject, collective minds, and collective 
intentions are fraught with criticism. For example, John Searle and Michael Bratman 
“individualize” collective intentions in order to reject strong conceptions of the plural 
agent. Both are concerned with avoiding the specter of the collective mind. Intention is a 
mental state, and minds belong to individuals or persons. As Searle notes, “talk about 
group minds . . . [is] at best mysterious and at worst incoherent.” John R. Searle, 
Collective Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 401, 404 (Phillip 
R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990). In Bratman’s words, “a shared intention is not an attitude in 
the mind of some superagent . . . .” Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS 97, 
98 (1993); cf. J. David Velleman, How to Share an Intention, 57 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 29 (1997); see also Concepts of Sharedness: Essays on 
Collective Intentionality (Hans Bernhard Schmid et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Concepts of 
Sharedness] (discussing collective intentionality). 
302 GILBERT, supra note 301, at 349. 
303 Margaret Gilbert, The Structure of the Social Atom: Joint Commitment as the 
Foundation of Human Social Behavior, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS: THE NATURE OF 
SOCIAL REALITY 39, 55 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003). 
304 Id. This argument has been recently applied to coauthorship, corporate 
responsibility, and explaining contested meanings. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1705−24 (2014); Bernadette Meyler, 
Accepting Contested Meanings, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 803, 803 (2013); Pammela Q. 
Saunders, Rethinking Corporate Human Rights Accountability, 89 TUL. L. REV. 603, 
634−36 (2015). 
305 Fromer, supra note 27, at 94. 
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“interpretive strategies,”306 and patterns for creating meanings. 
Gilbert claims, “there is no reason in principle why larger populations 
may not create joint commitments for themselves.”307 If this is 
correct, then authors and artists share a group-mindedness308 different 
than simple cooperation.309 This group-mindedness defines the depth 
of their cooperation and their collective commitment to and 
expectation of preserving a stable cultural environment in which 
dialogical transactions are not stifled by a rigid set of property rules. 
A dialogue, as defined by Bakhtin, Buber, and Bohm, is perhaps 
one of the best examples confirming the inevitable existence of plural 
subjects. A social activity, like dialoging, that requires 
interdependence between the subjects comprising the plural 
presupposes shared commitments and group-mindedness. By its very 
nature as a social transaction responsible for the evolution of human 
selves and groups, elements defining the public as a plural subject are 
embedded in every dialogical experience. If, as Deborah Perron 
Tollefsen argues, large groups and organizations are able to make, as 
a collective, rational choices independent of individual decisions,310 
then discussions of plural subjects, collective minds, and collective 
intention can expose some of the wrongs we nurture in copyright. 
Such as, for example, the need to reward authors solely on utilitarian 
grounds, industry incentives to generate more social wealth without 
authorizing access to this wealth, or a copyright culture based on 
exclusivity or on fear of being sued.311 
 
306 STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 161 (1980). 
307 Gilbert, supra note 303, at 55. 
308 Michael Tomasello et al., Two Key Steps in the Evolution of Human Cooperation: 
The Interdependence Hypothesis, 53 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 673, 685 (2012) 
(“Group-mindedness . . . relies on a kind of collective intentionality in which all members 
of the group participate, both following and enforcing the norms that define the group and 
stabilize its cooperative activities.”). 
309 Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy, What Makes Human Cognition Unique? 
From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality, 18 MIND & LANGUAGE 121 
(2003). See generally MICHAEL TOMASELLO, WHY WE COOPERATE (2009). 
310 Deborah Perron Tollefsen, Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences, 32 
PHIL. SOC. SCI. 25, 27 (2002). 
311 For example, a study found that educators fear the consequences of making copies 
of copyrighted materials for classroom use, although these uses are permitted under 
copyright law. WILLIAM W. FISHER & WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, THE DIGITAL LEARNING 
CHALLENGE: OBSTACLES TO EDUCATIONAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE: A FOUNDATIONAL WHITE PAPER 1, 57–61 (Berkman Centre for Internet & 
Society, Pub. No. 2006-09), https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2006/The_Digital 
_Learning_Challenge (last visited Dec. 10, 2016); see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion 
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Bakhtin, Buber, and Bohm’s conceptualization of dialogue tells us 
that modern copyright laws block access to knowledge in ways that 
diminish the opportunity to rearticulate the relationship between 
individuals, users, and producers. Commodified texts are living 
constructs. They are linguistic expressions that deploy meaning and 
communicate messages constructed by social and cultural properties. 
Dialogism, as envisioned by Bakhtin, Buber, and Bohm, does greater 
justice to defining the essence of human creative expressions. It 
situates the creative act on a continuum of authorial voices, struggles, 
and thoughts, where every creative act takes and embeds in its final 
configuration “the multiple social contexts in which the signs that 
surround us are enunciated . . . .”312 
IV 
DIALOGICAL INTRICACIES 
This Part applies the dialogical transaction model to intellectual 
property controversies. In all examples used, the model would have 
given users and the public en masse rights of access more 
comprehensive than courts were willing to provide. The examples 
show that the narrowly constructed interpretation of copyright favored 
by courts is inconsonant with the societal environment that gave rise 
to the principles of copyright. A direct result of this inconsonance is 
that “the concept of the author-genius has succeeded brilliantly in the 
legal realm, justifying ever-greater expansions of copyright—often 
for the benefit of large corporations . . . .”313 Furthermore, 
applications of the dialogical transaction model highlight the risks 
embedded in a copyright system that restricts communicative 
experiences and demonstrates that the authorial self as dialogic 
transcends the cultural affiliation to individualism because, as 
Bakhtin, Buber, and Bohm would proclaim, the existence of the 
other—either the individual or collective other—is vital for the 
emergence and maturity of the authorial self. 
 
and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (showing 
how fair users are requested to pay for licenses in order to avoid subsequent litigation); 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 100 
(2010) (arguing that users “will always prefer to take less than what they perceive to be the 
permissible amount and will be sheltered from liability”). 
312 COOMBE, supra note 27, at 83. 
313 Tushnet, The Romantic Author, supra note 13. 
ZEMER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  10:19 AM 
2016] Dialogical Transactions 199 
The dialogical intricacies examined do not aim to declare the 
“death of the author,”314 deprive him of proprietary rights to the 
expressions of his talent, or claim that there is no authentic originality 
and every creation is in succession of imitation.315 The authorial self 
is a unique construct. Although the nature of copyrighted works as 
socially and dialogically constructed stands in sharp contrast to 
Macpherson-like approaches to possessive individualism,316 authors 
bring to the creative process their own unique personal properties 
which entitle them to a reward for the creative value they generate. 
This Part looks at examples from parody, architecture, urban art, and 
information networks to demonstrate the fundamentality of preserving 
dialogical spaces and how, if considered and applied in the course of 
copyright disputes, the dialogical transaction theory can provide basic 
interpretive tools with which to redesign copyright principles and 
restrict official constraints on access to, and the use of, creative 
properties. 
A. Official Parodies 
A parody is an example of a work that involves, builds upon, and 
produces strong dialogical transactions and puts limits on official 
rightholders’ authorial control of communicative exchanges. A 
parody is a unique dialogical construct akin to a “festive liberation of 
laughter.”317 Its ubiquity derives from its unavoidable reliance on 
another’s work, “muddying the original author’s viewpoint”318 while 
continuing a conversation on the meaning of the other’s version, 
displaying “repetition with critical difference”319 and creating a 
“refunctioning of preformed linguistic or artistic material.”320 These 
characteristics demonstrate the role of otherness in the process of 
making parodies premised upon intense dialogical relations between 
 
314 See Barthes, supra note 13. 
315 See generally JONATHON KEATS, FORGED: WHY FAKES ARE THE GREAT ART OF 
OUR AGE (2013). 
316 CRAWFORD B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE 
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1972). 
317 BAKHTIN, RABELAIS, supra note 174, at 89. For an interesting inquiry into the 
festive aspect of parodies, see DAVID R. SMITH, PARODY AND FESTIVITY IN EARLY 
MODERN ART: ESSAYS ON COMEDY AS SOCIAL VISION (2012). 
318 Fromer, supra note 27. 
319 LINDA HUTCHEON, A THEORY OF PARODY: THE TEACHINGS OF TWENTIETH-
CENTURY ART FORMS 6 (Univ. of Illinois Press 2000) (1985). 
320 MARGARET A. ROSE, PARODY: ANCIENT, MODERN, AND POST-MODERN 52 (1993). 
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the author of the original text, the author of the parody, and the 
audience. 
Two decades ago, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the 
Supreme Court held parody to be a valuable form of social 
communication that “lie[s] at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright . . . .”321 
The recent growth of parodic expressions made them “central to the 
American conversation,”322 irrespective of original authors’ attempts 
to treat parodies as unwanted or coerced speech.323 Parodies became a 
form of communication that reflected society’s image and need for 
humor and freedom from official restraints on expressive creativity—
a form of communication that dismantled the primacy of authorial 
control and the hegemonic power of right holders to facilitate creative 
transactions and establish vibrant “interpretive communities.”324 
In Campbell, the Court supported a parody of Roy Orbison’s 
famous song “Oh, Pretty Woman” by the rap group, 2 Live Crew.325 
The success of 2 Live Crew prompted the right holder of Orbison’s 
song to sue for infringement.326 The district court granted summary 
judgment for 2 Live Crew on the ground that the song was a parody 
within the meaning of the Copyright Act.327 The court of appeals 
reversed and remanded, holding, inter alia, that, because 2 Live Crew 
took the heart of Orbison’s song and had market success with the 
song, the parody could not qualify as fair use.328 The Supreme Court 
 
321 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
322 William McGeveran, The Imaginary Trademark Parody Crisis (and the Real One), 
90 WASH. L. REV. 713, 714 (2015); see also DAN HARRIES, FILM PARODY 22 (2000) 
(observing that cinematic parody has become a “major mode of Hollywood film-making”); 
HUTCHEON, supra note 319, at 3, 109–11 (1985) (discussing the ideological and cultural 
implications of parodies); Jonathan Gray, Television Teaching: Parody, The Simpsons, and 
Media Literacy Education, 22 CRITICAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 223, 228 (2005) (noting 
that contemporary television is “heavily populated by parody and parodic texts”). 
323 KWALL, supra note 3, at 59–60 (“The free speech interests of subsequent users must 
be balanced against those of original authors not to have their works distorted or modified 
in objectionable ways with implicit or explicit attribution, resulting in a coerced use of 
their expression.”). 
324 David Tan, The Transformative Potential of Countercultural Recoding in Copyright 
Law: A Study of Superheroes and Fair Use, in DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS 403, 403 (Irene Calboli & Srividhya 
Ragavan eds., 2015). 
325 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594. 
326 Id. at 573–74. 
327 Id. at 573; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (defining the fair use exception). 
328 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 573–74. 
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reversed, finding 2 Live Crew’s use of the original to be sufficiently 
transformative to constitute fair use.329 
Two aspects of the Supreme Court’s Campbell judgment are 
noteworthy. First, after examining the four-pronged test of fair use, 
the Court concluded that the lower appellate court erred by giving all 
but dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody in 
accordance with the presumption,330 ostensibly culled from Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., which provides, 
“every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively . . . 
unfair . . . .”331 Second, the Court justified the need to adopt the heart 
of the song for the parody to take shape.332 A parodist relies on the 
individual other—the original author—to be able to create a work of 
public interest. He likewise relies on the generalized or imagined 
other—the audience—who needs to be sufficiently familiar with the 
original in order to understand, absorb, and value the parody and 
respond to and communicate with its message. Because an 
understanding of the original work is vital, a parodist must use the 
“heart” of the original song.333 In this sense, a parodist is both a 
parasitic user and an original creator.334 The parodist employs the 
heart of an original expression but then brings to the audience 
something that the original work never intended to do.335 It is that 
heart that most readily conjures the original in its parody and allows 
the audience to recognize it as such.336 The interpretation of the 
parody defense in Campbell substantiated the interconnected nature of 
a parodied text and its unique dialogical construct. 
 
329 Id. at 594. 
330 Id. 
331 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) 
(emphasis added). 
332 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588–89. 
333 Id. 
334 Abraham Drassinower, A Note on Incentives, Rights, and the Public Domain in 
Copyright Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1869, 1884 (2011) (“[F]air use or fair dealing 
for the purpose of criticism is fair because the defendant is responding to the plaintiffs 
work in her own work. She is not merely repeating the work parasitically.”). 
335 Michael Spence, Intellectual Property and the Problem of Parody, 114 L.Q. REV. 
594, 607 (1998) (arguing that a parodist “must be able to use existing works if he is to 
communicate effectively”). 
336 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588 (“What makes for this recognition is quotation of the 
original’s most distinctive or memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the 
audience will know.”). 
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It would be a mistake to think that “anyone who calls himself a 
parodist can skim the cream and get away scot free.”337 Indeed, the 
judgments in parody cases show that courts treat the defense as 
“contingent, not absolute.”338 Thus, courts will have to continue to 
define the limits to parodies because authors of parodied works (and 
their heirs) will continue to invoke their exclusive right to reproduce, 
adapt, distribute, and display the original work,339 including its 
derivative uses,340 even while the work is still protected and has not 
entered the public domain.341 However, in this process, attention is 
owed to the basic definition of a parody as a form of expression 
aiming to facilitate free, unrestrained, dialogue—a place for criticism, 
laughter, and creative chaos.342 When Bakhtin celebrated the 
medieval parody, he gave as an example the medieval carnival, 
largely to rescue a notion of a politicized popular laughter in an era 
characterized by a hegemonic religious-state order. If legalized 
 
337 Id. at 589. The need to limit a wide definition of “parody” is fundamental; 
otherwise, we may end up with an uncontrollable copycatting culture where carnivalesque 
mocking, imitating or spoofing becomes the norm and replaces “piracy” of popular 
cultural expression, programs, and brands with “justified use.” Hu, supra note 173. 
Therefore, intellectual property laws are required to suppress the expansion of copycatting. 
Barton Beebe, Shanzhai, Sumptuary Law, and Intellectual Property Law in Contemporary 
China, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 872–73 (2014). 
338 McGeveran, supra note 322, at 720. 
339 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
340 Id. § 103(a). 
341 Id. § 302(a). 
342 Two decades after Campbell, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
defined “parody” for the first time and endorsed certain aspects from Campbell. Case C-
201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX WESTLAW 613CJ0201, at 
para. 20 (Sept. 3, 2014). That case arose from the request of a Belgian Court to provide a 
uniform definition of the prerequisites for a lawful parody under European law. See id. 
The Court also had to deal with the task of drawing the definitional limits of parody. Id. 
The Court stated that if a parody conveys a discriminatory message—for example, by 
replacing the original characters with people wearing veils and people of color—the 
holders of the rights to the work parodied have, in principle, a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that their work is not associated with such a message. Id. at para. 29. One blogger 
commented on the CJEU decision, asserted that it can be a slippery slope, and asked: 
Could there potentially be developing a big humour gap between the EU and the 
rest of world – at least with the USA? One wonders how the CJEU, in light of 
this decision, would have looked at the raunchy and arguably anything but 
“politically correct” rap lyrics of the 2 Live Crew parody lyrics of “Pretty 
Woman” that pretty soon turns into “Big Hairy Woman” and go rapidly downhill 
from there . . . . But it was fine for the US Supreme Court in 1994. 
Howard Knopf, commenting on, Parody, Deckmyn and the Right to Object to 
Discriminatory Messages: Today’s CJEU Ruling, THE 1709 BLOG (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://the1709blog.blogspot.co.il/2014/09/parody-deckmyn-and-right-to-object-to.html 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2016). 
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“[m]edieval laughter is directed at the same object as medieval 
seriousness,” then the clown and the foul can ridicule the church and 
the state and build a world separated from the official world—their 
“own church versus the official church, [their] own state versus the 
official state.”343 The unrestrained legalization of laughter came in 
“small scattered islands of time,” as official feasts took place, and it 
rid people of the fear of intimidation or prohibitions because 
“[b]arriers were raised,” and laughter took precedent.344 
Bakhtin used parody not as a way to criticize an original text but as 
a dialogical dimension of literature. Parody and laughter “does not 
deny seriousness but purifies and completes it. Laughter purifies from 
dogmatism . . . it liberates from fanaticism and pedantry, from fear 
and intimidation, from didacticism, naiveté and illusion, from the 
single meaning . . . .”345 Parodies allow cultures to evolve and serve 
as platforms for “ongoing activity of transformative meaning-
making.”346 Parody, a ridiculing imitation of an original work, is “not 
a form, but rather a relation between one text and another; it is a 
function”347 that creates a “hybrid and double-voiced” discourse.348 
For example, Woody Allen’s film Play It Again Sam is a 1972 parody 
of the 1942 classic film Casablanca, and aims to parody 
“Hollywood’s aesthetic tradition of allowing only a certain kind of 
mythologizing in film . . . .”349 In copyright terms, one function of a 
parody is to create space for creative freedom independent of the 
availability of unprotectable ideas or facts and to allow parodists to 
use the heart of the original work. A parody cannot resemble a parade 
with a climax. If a parody is an expression aimed at satisfying official 
wills and interests, then it is not a parody. 
Despite the fact that courts seem somewhat more receptive to 
parodies post-Campbell,350 and the fact that “[w]hen IP owners use 
 
343 BAKHTIN, RABELAIS, supra note 174, at 88–90. 
344 Id. at 90. 
345 Id. at 123. 
346 Coombe, supra note 13, at 1877. 
347 Lars Kleberg, Parody and Double-Voiced Discourse: On the Language Philosophy 
of Mikhail Bakhtin, in DIALOGUE AND TECHNOLOGY: ART AND KNOWLEDGE 95, 96 (Bo 
Göranzon & Magnus Florin eds., 1991) (emphasis added). 
348 HUTCHEON, supra note 315, at 28; see also Denisov, supra note 158, at 56 (“[I]t is 
natural that the ‘original-parody’ relationship is always bilateral.”). 
349 HUTCHEON, supra note 319, at 26. 
350 A famous example is Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 
(11th Cir. 2001), where the Eleventh Circuit vacated an injunction barring the publication 
of Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone (2001). 
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copyright law to suppress parodies, the courts have generally rejected 
those claims,”351 the road is still “long and convoluted.”352 Even if 
courts are more willing to accept parodies as a form of expression 
worthy of protection under fair use,353 the expansion of intellectual 
property laws mitigates this judicial tendency.354 This constrains the 
potential breadth of parodic opportunities and has deterrent effects on 
cultural activities. First, it discourages “overt reliance on earlier 
works . . . .”355 Second, strong copyrights “conflict with the human 
propensity to respond to stories by altering and retelling them.”356 
Third, the official is continuously reinvigorated by laws limiting fair 
uses and free access to creative content. Fourth, because copyright 
law includes many vague principles, it creates, absent bright-line rules 
 
351 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473, 
473 (2013). 
352 McGeveran, supra note 322, at 715. For example, in 1996 Dr. Seuss Enterprises 
successfully sued Penguin Books for copyright infringement, a rejection of the parody 
defense. Dr. Seuss Enters, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (1997); see 
also Esther Milne, Parody: Affective Registers, Amateur Aesthetics and Intellectual 
Property, 19 CULTURAL STUD. REV. 193, 199 (2013) (observing that “the parody defence 
within US case law has not always been successful”). Moreover, the struggle of courts to 
distinguish between parody and satire, detrimentally affects the definition of parody. See 
Amy Lai, Copyright and Its Parody Defense: Multiple Legal Perspectives, 4 N.Y.U. J. 
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 311, 320 (2015) (“[T]he Court’s narrow definition of parody and 
its determination that satire is not protected to the same degree as parody, have arguably 
served to expand owners’ rights to the detriment of creative citizens.”). 
353 See, e.g., Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(finding fair use in a case involving a South Park episode, the court ruled on fair use 
defense against copyright infringement on a motion to dismiss because it only required to 
compare the original work with the parody). 
354 McGeveran, supra note 322 (contemplating that the “spread of parody coincides 
with the huge expansion of trademark law to confer much broader rights”); see also Robin 
Jacob, Parody and IP Claims: A Defence?—A Right to Parody?, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 427 (Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014). In addition, it is a cause of concern that lower 
courts seem less willing to embrace a wide interpretation of freedom to parody. See, e.g., 
McGeveran, supra note 322, at 722 (“Lower courts have not always been so sensitive and 
have sometimes been clumsy in applying the ‘parody’ label.”); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d 
at1270; see also Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In Salinger, 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of Salinger, the 
author of the 1951 novel, The Catcher in the Rye. Id. at 254. Colting wrote a critique of 
Salinger in his book, 60 Years Later: Coming through the Rye. Id. The Court found that 
this was not a parody entitled to protection as a transformative work under the fair use 
doctrine. Id. at 268–69. In April 2010, the Second Circuit upheld the injunction granted by 
the district court. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
355 Tushnet, The Romantic Author, supra note 13, at 302. 
356 Id. 
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as to what amounts to a parody,357 a culture of fear amongst users that 
they may be sued358 and that their “remix [will be] threatened with 
sanctions.”359 It is a culture that prevents competition with protected 
works360 and favors settlements and financial concessions regardless 
of the fairness of the use,361 all to satisfy owners who demand the 
eradication of parodies directed at their intangible properties.362 
Recent scholarship observes how pervasive these problems are in the 
field of trademarks. For example, Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley 
show that “courts have struggled with the evaluation of parody under 
trademark law,” given the “surprising number of cases that hold 
obvious parodies illegal.”363 In these cases, courts enclosed the 
evolution of meanings, limited the availability of communicative 
experiences, and refused to treat parodies as a “natural and desirable 
 
357 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New 
Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 668 (1997) (observing that “it is difficult to 
draw clear lines between parody and other types of transformative use, including political 
protest”); see also Fromer & Lemley, supra note 96, at 1257 (“Because IP laws protect 
intangible concepts, communicating what the IP right covers is more difficult than 
articulating the scope of property rights for tangible items, whose bounds are easier to 
describe and depict.”). 
358 See Tollefsen, supra note 310. 
359 Tushnet, The Romantic Author, supra note 13, at 314. 
360 An example to this power is found in employment contracts that display “archaic 
control mentality” by increasingly restricting employees’ motivation and performance. 
ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, 
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 4 (2013). 
361 For example, despite the finding of the Court in favor of a parody, Alice Randall’s 
publishing company settled with the estate of Margaret Mitchell, the author of the novel 
Gone with the Wind (1936), to make an unspecified donation to Morehouse College. David 
D. Kirkpatrick, Mitchell Estate Settles Gone With the Wind Suit, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/10/business/mitchell-estate-settles-gone-with-the 
-wind-suit.html. An additional example is the 2014 copyright dispute involving Beastie 
Boys. In this dispute, a settlement was reached between the hip-hop group and a toy 
company, GoldieBlox, over the unauthorized use of a 1987 hit song “Girls” in a viral 
video. Jon Blistein, Beastie Boys Settled over ‘Girls’ Toy Commercial, ROLLINGSTONE 
(Mar. 18, 2014), www.rollingstone.com/music/news/beastie-boys-settle-lawsuit-over-
girls-toy-com mercial-20140318. After the former filed a preemptive suit against Beastie 
Boys for a declaratory judgment that their video is a parody, the latter sued in return 
claiming copyright infringement. Id. The parties settled within four months of the initial 
filing. Id.; see also J.D. Salinger’s Miserly Legal Legacy, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 17, 2011) 
(discussing the settlement reached between the heirs of Salinger and Colting), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/01/copywrongs. 
362 McGeveran, supra note 322, at 715 (“While there are few litigated cases, 
marketholders routinely send cease-and-desist letters demanding the eradication of 
parodies aimed at their trademarks. Many parodists comply.”). 
363 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 351, at 474, 490–96. 
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part of social conversation,” even in the absence of harm to the 
mark.364 
Parodies are invaluable to modern societies.365 Bakhtin 
emphasized “the importance of the comic elements which had been 
either eliminated, overlooked, or looked down upon by some 
formalist and other modern critics.”366 Parodies serve as the place 
where the real carnivalesque experience resides. As such, their social 
and cultural impact is vast and “often explodes traditional thought 
patterns, being a catalyst for further creative quests.”367 The 
Campbell Court allowed the silliest or most lowbrow speech to escape 
liability for infringement. However, contemporary expansions of 
intellectual property rights raise concerns as to the future of these 
critical and comic dialogical works. 
When parodies become the voice of the official, by virtue of the 
boundaries imposed upon users by the law, the official defines the 
evolution of meanings. Meaning cannot be controlled by 
governmental or corporate power because such control would “lead to 
social stultification and cultural paralysis.”368 Stifling the progression 
 
364 Id. at 496. 
365 This is especially true in jurisdictions that either do not recognize, or have just 
recently begun to recognize, parody as fair use. For example, until October 1, 2014, a 
parodist in the UK could escape copyright liability if his use of an original work could be 
viewed as criticism or review of the work. LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 241 (4th ed., 2014). This, however, “was anything but 
straightforward.” Id. Following several governmental reports, a new fair dealing exception 
for “caricature, parody or pastiche” was introduced into British copyright law. Gowers 
Review of Intellectual Property, THE GOWERS REVIEW  (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.gov.uk 
/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228849/0118404830.pdf, 
recommendation 12 at 68; Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property, 
UK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (Jan. 2008), http://www.rin.ac.uk/system/files 
/attachments/UKIPO%20consultn%20on%20copyrightexceptions%20Jan%2008.pdf, at 6–
31; Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, DEPARTMENT 
FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION & SKILLS, HARGREAVES REV. INTELL. PROP. & GROWTH 
(May 18, 2011), http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data 
/file/32563/ipreview-finalreport.pdf, at 1–50; Modernising Copyright: A Modern, Robust 
and Flexible Framework, HMGOVERNMENT (July 26, 2012), http://www.allpartywriters 
group.co.uk/Documents/PDF/Modernising-copyright.aspx, at 29–31; see also The 
Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotations and Parody) Regulations 2014, SI 
2014/2356 (Eng.) (incorporating amendments to The Copy, Designs and Patents Act 1988, 
c. 48 (Eng.).—mainly section 30A(1)). 
366 ROSE, supra note 320, at 169. 
367 Denisov, supra note 161, at 69. As the Supreme Court explained in Campbell: “Like 
less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody] can provide social benefit, by 
shedding light on earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.” Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
368 Johnson, supra note 169, at 457. 
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of meaning is a major concern wherever there is a privately owned 
and led copyright regime. In such a regime, the availability of 
dialogical opportunities necessary to feed authorial and artistic 
creation is severely restricted. The immediate consequence is that 
creative works will fail both to yield the expected social value and to 
“advance society’s knowledge systematically, factually, and 
culturally.”369 Such a copyright regime will produce works and 
meanings that resemble low-level conversations or other simple 
verbal exchanges. 
B. Urban Voices 
1. Multivoiced Tangibles 
Dialogism conveys interaction. This includes interaction with 
fellow beings as well as with properties of the urban space such as 
architectural designs; street art; non-traditional art forms like land 
art;370 and other tangibles such as books, furniture, and even plastic 
bags.371 Thus, the “other” can be a person or an object. Both produce 
voices within the authorial self. For example, discussing Buber’s 
conception of art, Biswas remarks: 
We desire also to enter into personal relationships with things and 
to imprint on them our relation to them . . . . Artistic creation and 
awareness proceeds from our dissatisfaction with the stringent 
meaning-contents of the world of It and our urge to elevate it to the 
level of intimacy with our own being.372 
For John Locke, the most celebrated political philosopher on 
intellectual property,373 man must converse and communicate with 
others in order to create, accumulate, refine, and disseminate 
knowledge.374 Locke claimed that every system of regulation must 
limit knowledge enclosure and “enable us to deliver and make that 
 
369 Fromer, supra note 27, at 86. 
370 See, e.g., Xiyin Tang, Copyright in the Expanded Field, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 945 
(2014) (discussing options for legal protection of nontraditional art forms such as land art). 
In a recent case, the Seventh Circuit explained the complexity of attaching copyright 
protection to land art such as a wildflower garden. Kelly v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 
(7th Cir. 2011). 
371 See RONI MESHULAM ABRAMOVITZ, A JOURNEY WITH A PLASTIC BAG: AN 
INTIMATE DIALOGUE BETWEEN WRITING, SCULPTURE AND PHOTOGRAPHY (2014). 
372 Biswas, supra note 98, at 225. 
373 See, e.g., Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 891, 892 n.1 (2006). 
374 JOHN LOCKE, Study (1677), in JOHN LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS 365 (Mark Goldie 
ed., 1997). 
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knowledge available to others.”375 In addition to human interaction, 
commoners converse with tangibles, from which they generate 
creative ideas. Locke gave the example of an artist painting the 
“springs and wheels and other contrivances within of the famous 
clock at Strasburg.”376 To do so, the artist uses items in his memory 
that come to him once he sees the clock and the surrounding cultural 
scene. The clock generates ideas and inner voices within the artist’s 
self. From these, the artist develops creative meanings embedded in 
his expression. Justine Hughes proclaimed that authors “produce the 
basic units of dialogue” necessary for copyrightable expressions,377 
but that does not mean that they are above societal dialogue. On 
Lockean grounds, the process by which these units are produced is 
influenced by properties both verbal and nonverbal, by humans and 
tangibles alike. 
Written materials are the tangible source most likely to generate 
creative ideas. Locke offered books as an example to show that 
people form conversational relations with sources other than humans. 
There are a myriad of books man should read, from those written by 
ancient lawyers, “books of travel,” chronological accounts, and 
readings of history that “help to give an insight into [human nature],” 
to poetical and dramatic books of pleasure and delight, and 
dictionaries that are necessary for the “gentlemen’s study.”378 
Exposure to a variety of books and conversation with the knowledge 
therein makes people more knowledgeable and creative. 
To allow readers access to a variety of books, people can own, and 
hence converse with, a physical book, but they cannot exclusively 
own the knowledge therein. Locke advocated for limits to what one 
could come to own, in order to ensure human interaction.379 Locke 
considered interaction and communication basic human values and 
provided that only by enjoying communicative experiences with 
fellow gentlemen, strangers, and external tangibles, could knowledge, 
information, and books be made possible. In the absence of 
 
375 JOHN LOCKE, Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentlemen 
(1703), in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS 348–49 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
LOCKE, Some Thoughts]. 
376 JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. III, ch. vi, § 3 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, ESSAY]. 
377 Hughes, supra note 39, at 976. 
378 LOCKE, Some Thoughts, supra note 375, at 352–54. 
379 Locke, Liberty of the Press, supra note 289, at 37. 
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communicative experiences, readers would end up reading 
commonplace arguments. As Locke put it: 
[Those who] converse but with one sort of men, they read but one 
sort of books, they will not come in the hearing but of one sort of 
notions: the truth is, They canton out to them selves a little Goshen 
in the intellectual world where light shines . . . but the rest of that 
vast expansum they give up to night and darkness, and so avoid 
coming near it.380 
Locke criticized the politics of educating through books filled with a 
“stock of borrowed and collected arguments”381 and contended that 
such an approach risked producing limited communicative 
experiences and conversational partners.382 A dialogical view of 
copyright addresses Locke’s concern for promoting the value of 
multivoicedness, cultural diversity, and communication. 
2. Multivoiced Places 
Urban spaces provide communicative platforms that contribute to 
collective and individual dialogical processes and revitalize 
neighborhoods and communities.383 They create “a space for mutual 
dialogue and creative interpretation . . . .”384 Art placed in urban 
spaces “provides a pretext for conversations and in some cases for 
cooperation between strangers.”385 A Lithuanian researcher found 
that publicly placed urban furniture—a “Street Komoda,” designed 
for sharing and inviting passers-by to intervene—in the Capital city of 
Vilnius, has created a network of users of the work, thereby 
generating new meanings. Just like Locke’s example of the clock in 
the center of Strasbourg igniting creative ideas in a communal space, 
 
380 LOCKE, Some Thoughts, supra note 375, at 349. That knowledge, communication 
and the role of the audience are important for Locke is evident also in his statement that 
“[w]hen a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of Speech is, 
that those Sounds, as Marks, may make known his Ideas to the Hearer.” LOCKE, ESSAY, 
supra note 376, bk. III, ch. ii, § 2. 
381 Locke, Of Study, supra note 290, at 123. 
382 Yeo, supra note 111, at 18. Ironically, when Thomas Hobbes’ reputation was being 
assailed, it was said that he did his cause no good by working alone too much. John Wallis 
(admittedly an enemy) alleged that “He [Hobbes] Thinks too much, and Converses too 
little, either with Books, or Men.” JOHN WALLIS, HOBBIUS HEAUTON-TIMORUMENOS 8 
(Oxford, 1662), cited in General Introduction, in THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THOMAS 
HOBBES VOL. II: 1660–1679, p. xxx (Noel Malcolm ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
383 Jekaterina Lavrinec, Community Art Initiatives as a Form of Participatory 
Research: The Case of Street Mosaic Workshop, 7 CREATIVITY STUD. 55 (2014). 
384 Id. at 56. 
385 Id. 
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this example shows how these kinds of participatory, artistic 
experiences “become a community setting” and turn passers-by into 
“potential co-authors of the whole project.”386 
Architectural and other properties of the urban space function as 
open communicative and multivoiced sites for artists and dweller 
informants—the consumers of public places. Meanings generated by 
urban art are created through two main channels: First, by artists who 
externalize their personalities in order to express themselves “outside 
given aesthetic standards.”387 They use this form of expression as a 
way to share with others “their emotional relationship to life”388 and 
to “stress the importance of communicating with outsiders as well as 
the quality of their art.”389 Artists of urban art engage in intensive 
dialogical transactions with others. They “use the aesthetics of 
popular culture, consumerism, and other socio-political themes to 
converse with each other and their viewers.”390 Second, urban art is 
created by members of the public acting as a community of translators 
“who become potential co-authors” of street art.391 
Viewers form an integral part of the urban space and its 
development. This explains why architectural works are “laced with 
cultural and psychological dimensions”392 that make the planning 
process a dialogical transaction between architects and the various 
audiences likely to be affected by the design. We are all exposed to 
copyrighted architectural designs on a daily basis. In fact, while 
“individuals may choose to opt out of the consumption of other public 
goods, preferring, for example, private schools over public schools, 
and bottled water over tap water, it is impossible not to consume 
public space at all.”393 This exposure, with particular regard to public 
architectural art, leads to intensive communication between viewers, 
 
386 Id. at 57. 
387 Meike Watzlawik, The “Art” of Identity Development—Graffiti Painters Moving 
Through Time and Space, 20 CULTURE & PSYCHOL. 404, 413 (2014). 
388 Mariane Hedegaard, Exploring Tension and Contradictions in Youth’s Activity of 
Painting Graffiti, 20 CULTURE & PSYCHOL. 387, 396 (2014). 
389 Watzlawik, supra note 387, at 409. 
390 Laura Werthmann, Street Art Dialogue, XV GNOVIS J. 1, 4 (2015); see also SUSAN 
C. HAEDICKE, CONTEMPORARY STREET ARTS IN EUROPE: AESTHETICS AND POLITICS 3 
(2013) (observing that street artists create “safe public spaces that encourage gathering and 
dialogue”). 
391 Lavrinec, supra note 383, at 60. 
392 KENDRA SCHANK SMITH, ARCHITECTS’ SKETCHES: DIALOGUE AND DESIGN 3 
(2008). 
393 Luca M. Visconti et al., Street Art, Sweet Art? Reclaiming the “Public” in Public 
Place, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 511, 512 (2010). 
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architects, and producers of urban art. The exposure also affects 
viewers’ wellbeing, even the construction of their national identity.394 
Although architecture will always “compete poorly with utilitarian 
demands for humanity’s sources,”395 a city’s architectural tapestry 
has a powerful impact on our happiness and sense of belonging, 
goodness,396 collective memories, and shared identities.397 Therefore, 
when applying copyright principles to architectural designs, we must 
note the role of viewers on such designs, and, in turn, the designs’ 
permanent and infinite existence and effect on viewers. 
Artists sometimes use the urban space as a large museum in which 
to display their creative talent through street art like graffiti, murals, 
sticker art, “Lock on” street sculptures, and other  installations. Street 
art is a fast-growing artistic movement that has been compared to the 
cubist revolution.398 Street artists like Banksy, Haring, Shepard, Gaia, 
and Basquiat have created art unique in its relationship to and 
inseparability from its surroundings and in its ability to communicate 
instantly to viewers. Street artists use public locations like buildings, 
subway stations, doorways, and walls and consider the public space 
their essential working environment. Street art transforms urban 
spaces into large dialogical and meaning-making forums. Street 
artists, regardless of whether their art is unsolicited or invited, create 
places. Harrison and Dourish differentiate space and place by noting 
that “[s]pace is the opportunity; place is the understood reality.”399 As 
Martin Irvine elaborated: 
Street art also assumes a foundational dialogism in which each new 
act of making a work and inserting it into a street context is a 
response, a reply, an engagement with prior works and the ongoing 
debate about the public visual surface of a city. As dialogue-in-
progress, it anticipates a response, public discourse, commentary, 
 
394 Aura Bertoni & Maria Lillà Montagnani, Public Architectural Art and its Spirits of 
Instability, 5 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 247 (2015). 
395 ALAIN DE BOTTON, THE ARCHITECTURE OF HAPPINESS 18 (2006). 
396 Id. at 199. 
397 Visconti et al., supra note 393, at 513. 
398 MAGDA DANYSZ & MARY-NOËLLE DANA, FROM STYLE WRITING TO ART: A 
STREET ART ANTHOLOGY 18 (2011). The growth in street art produced a vibrant market 
for these works, and it also created a corpus of legal conflicts regarding the appropriation 
of street art by book publishers, clothing companies, and even Olympic swimming teams. 
See Celia Lerman, Protecting Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and Copyright Law, 2 N.Y.U. J. 
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 295, 297–307 (2013). 
399 Steve Harrison & Paul Dourish, Re-place-ing Space: The Roles of Place and Space 
in Collaborative Systems, in CSCW ‘96—PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1996 ACM CONFERENCE 
ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 67, 69 (Mark S. Ackerman ed., 1996). 
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new works. The city is seen as a living historical palimpsest open 
for new inscription, re-write culture in practice.400 
Street art can be either commissioned or uncommissioned, and as 
such, it creates legal ramifications for the law-art divide. For example, 
because illegality and anonymity are integral components of graffiti, 
major graffiti works are part of intellectual property’s “negative 
space” —an area that intellectual property law may regulate, but 
declines to.401 These problems notwithstanding, the meanings street 
art produces can never be commissioned. They represent a continuous 
conversation between the artists, property owners, and known and 
unknown users. This raises other legal ramifications relating to the 
tension between, for example, the First Amendment and property 
rights,402 and between copyright and moral rights.403 
The Ninth Circuit recently answered in the affirmative the question 
of whether the unauthorized use of a street artist’s work in the video 
backdrop of a rock band’s stage show was a fair use under U.S. 
copyright law.404 In 2003, street artist and illustrator Derek Seltzer 
created Scream Icon, a drawing of a screaming, contorted face.405 His 
work became very popular: posters of the print were plastered on 
walls as street art in Los Angeles and elsewhere.406 In 2008, Richard 
Staub, set designer for Green Day’s 2009–2010 tour, took a 
photograph of a brick wall covered in graffiti and posters, including a 
reproduction of Scream Icon.407 He used the photograph to create a 
four-minute video depicting the alleyway, graffiti and all.408 The 
center of the video is dominated by an unchanging but modified 
Scream Icon; its modifications include the addition of, for example, 
“a large red ‘spray-painted’ cross over the middle of the screaming 
 
400 Martin Irvine, The Work on the Street: Street Art and Visual Culture, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF VISUAL CULTURE 235, 242 (Ian Heywood & Barry Sandywell eds., 2012). 
401 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1765 (2006) (defining the 
negative space of intellectual property as those areas in which creation and innovation 
thrive without significant protection). 
402 Margaret L. Mettler, Graffiti Museum: A First Amendment Argument for Protecting 
Uncommissioned Art on Private Property, 111 MICH. L. REV. 249, 251 (2012). 
403 See, e.g., Eldar Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works, 
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 454, 467 (2014); Amy Wang, Graffiti and the Visual Artists Rights 
Act, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 141 (2015). 
404 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
405 Id. at 1173. 
406 Id. at 1173–74. 
407 Id. at 1174. 
408 Id. 
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face.”409 Quoting Campbell, the Ninth Circuit held that Staub’s video 
was transformative, altering Seltzer’s work “with new expression, 
meaning or message.”410 The court explained that the spray-painted 
cross in Staub’s video, in conjunction with the song’s message about 
hypocrisy, conveyed new aesthetics and understanding.411 The 
decision opened the door for other musical stage shows to incorporate 
existing artworks and, in doing so, inadvertently recognized the social 
role of urban art—its nature as multivoiced, open, and continuous 
dialogue. In other words, the decision confirms the transactional 
nature of street art. If viewers contribute to the meaning of street art 
by virtue of being exposed to it, communicating with it, and making it 
part of their inner selves—then they own a legitimate right to reuse it. 
Although “people are too quick to view street art through the lens 
of vandalism”412 and often “speak of graffiti and street art as the 
imposition of some personal will upon the public good,”413 graffiti is 
a form of art that “deploys aesthetics in the service of a reclaimed 
commons.”414 Graffiti engages the public in “practiced dialogism, 
using and exploring the basic grammar of art through art history . . . 
and creating new codes to be entered into the conversation.”415 Street 
artists “bemoan the rapid disappearance of public space”416 because 
“the rules of property take precedence over the inherent rights of free 
use and self-expression.”417 On the one hand, consider the tragic 
example of the 5Pointz site in New York, which was once “the largest 
collection of exterior aerosol art . . . in the United States,”418 and is 
now demolished.419 On the other hand, we see courts, like that in 
Green Day, reluctant to reimagine artistic appropriation or accept the 
cultural effect of urban art on users appropriating this art.420 
 
409 Id. 
410 Id. at 1177. 
411 Id. 
412 Marc Schiller & Sara Schiller, Preface to TRESPASS: A HISTORY OF 
UNCOMMISSIONED URBAN ART, 10, 11 (Ethel Seno ed., 2010). 
413 Id. at 23. 
414 Visconti et al., supra note 393, at 525. 
415 Werthmann, supra note 390, at 7. 
416 Schiller & Schiller, supra note 412. 
417 Id. at 23. 
418 Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (E.D.N.Y 2013). 
419 Susanna Frederick Fischer, Who’s the Vandal? The Recent Controversy Over the 
Destruction of 5Pointz and How Much Protection Does Moral Rights Law Give to 
Authorized Aerosol Art?, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 326, 333–34 (2015). 
420 See Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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Urban art, as an engagement with the public, creates a bridge 
between artists and unsolicited viewers—a continuous invitation to 
converse with the work. In this way, urban art emancipates the 
spectator by redefining his ordinary cultural scene. The street 
becomes a theatre. Viewers are not so much participants in the 
spectacle; rather, they are members of a community of translators of 
the event or work.421 Members of the community converse about the 
works in a Hazlitt or De Quincey style and, in doing so, create new 
meanings. Community members cannot avoid the presence of such 
works. Urban art exemplifies that a creative idea does not fully reside 
in one person’s isolated consciousness but rather “begins to live”422 
only when it enters into dialogue with the voices of others, only when 
it forms a communion with others.423 In Buber’s words, urban art 
explains why creative expressions are best defined as continuous 
events of “genuine dialogic moments.”424 
C. Scarce Cybercarnival425 
Information networks, as opposed to traditional creative industries, 
offer an unprecedented wealth of information and opportunities to 
dialogically transact with others. Within these networks, “tens of 
thousands of conversations, debates, and social dialogues”426 take 
place, and “[c]ontent ranges from academic writings, to art and 
literature, to medical information, to music, to news and other 
information . . . .”427 Although networks and other digital markets 
pose a serious threat to dialogists’ ideal of genuine communication 
based on face-to-face interaction,428 their ubiquitous nature has 
“enabled individuals—even impecunious amateurs—to create and 
 
421 HAEDICKE, supra note 390, at 80–81. 
422 Friedman, supra note 156. 
423 BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS, supra note 156. 
424 Buber, supra note 234. 
425 The term “cybercarnival” is borrowed from, Johnson, supra note 169, at 484 (using 
this term to criticize the expansion of intellectual property laws at the expense of a wide-
open society). 
426 PSINet, Inc.  v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (W.D. Va. 2000). 
427 Id. As Jacob Rowbottom put it: “While content on social networks such as Twitter 
and Facebook are often characterized as conversations, those platforms can include high 
level content from media companies and professional advertising campaigns.” 
Rowbottom, supra note 110, at 371. 
428 Anderson & Cissna, supra note 209, at 148 (arguing that technology “changes 
communicators’ goals and affects the vectors of speaking and listening, presence and 
absence”). 
ZEMER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  10:19 AM 
2016] Dialogical Transactions 215 
communicate in ways that were previously possible only for well-
funded corporate publishers.”429 
Users enjoy the prominence of the networks and digital media that 
provide an infinite source of materials to consume, manipulate, mix, 
and remix,430 making users an integral part of the development 
process of the digital culture.431 As such, information networks may 
provide carnivalesque experiences by making room for a multiplicity 
of voices and meanings. After all, the Internet is “individualistic, 
informal, decentralized and extremely resistant to authority and 
control,”432 a “perfect post-modern medium,”433 and it encourages 
ideals of collective knowledge production and justified cultural 
takings. Moreover, the Internet has the potential “to weave the mass 
of humanity together into a thriving, infinitely powerful organism.”434 
However, given the nature of intellectual property rights as a form of 
governmental regulation of market entry and prices, “the rise of 
creativity- and communication-empowering technology has coincided 
with the expansion of the scope and duration of copyright protection 
and with new regulatory schemes designed to foster copyright-holder 
self-help.”435 James Boyle defined this as the “second enclosure 
 
429 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 
96 VA. L. REV. 549, 551 (2010). 
430 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE 
IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008). 
431 On the meaning of “digital culture,” see, e.g., HILDE G. CORNELIUSSEN & GILL 
WALKER RETTBERG, Introduction: “Orc Professor LFG”, or Researching in Azeroth, in 
DIGITAL CULTURE, PLAY AND IDENTITY: A WORLD OF WARCRAFT READER 3 (2008) (“A 
digital culture is, like every culture, constructed according to norms, rules and 
traditions.”); LAUREN RABINOVITZ & ABRAHAM GEIL, Introduction to MEMORY BYTES: 
HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND DIGITAL CULTURE 1, 4 (Lauren Rabinovitz & Abraham 
Geil eds., 2004) (defining digital culture as “a trope for the ethos of contemporary life”); 
see also Sean Cubitt, Case Study: Digital Aesthetics, in DIGITAL CULTURES: 
UNDERSTANDING NEW MEDIA 11, 23 (Glen Creeber & Royston Martin eds., 2009) 
(showing how digital representation of the world is aesthetically different from the one 
that was provided by the analogue and how it transformed our professional and personal 
lives); Jenlink & Banathy, supra note 139, at 162 (defining the digital culture as a new 
culture with new rules, that values diversity and considers difference “as the very energy 
that fires social and cultural creativity”). 
432 Johnson, supra note 169, at 474. 
433 Id. 
434 Howe, supra note 24, at 11. 
435 Shaffer Van Houweling, supra note 429, at 552; see also Lee Edwards et al., 
Communicating Copyright: Discourse and Disagreement in the Digital Age, in THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 300, 301 (Matthew David & Debora Halbert 
eds., 2015) (discussing the evolution of, and how to solve, the “division between the 
beliefs of users and the norms expressed in copyright regulation”). 
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movement”436 where limits to individuals’ freedom to reuse existing 
information are continuously introduced. This movement risks 
reinvigorating the feudal system, the industrial model, or the 
institutionalization of, what Gille Deleuze called, the “control 
society,”437 in which individuals, as well as institutions, use their 
power to overregulate, foreclose market production, and restrict social 
communications and free access to information.438 This and other 
“regimes of authorization”439 aim to control the development of the 
information society and to produce “a configuration of networked 
space that is increasingly opaque.”440 
When Jürgen Habermas coined one of his famous critical concepts, 
“ideal speech situations,”441 he explained the error of manipulated 
and distorted visions of communication favoring authority and control 
over participatory and inclusive dialogues. The concept “can be 
understood as the projection of the conditions for a perfect 
discussion”442 and the avoidance of the “imbalance of power between 
the participants to the conversation.”443 This means “nobody can 
force his opinions upon anyone else, and cannot exclude somebody 
from the discussion, or prevent them raising problems or 
challenges.”444 It has long been argued that the institution of modern 
copyright perpetuates inequalities between authors and the public. By 
favoring individual owners, modern copyright principles impose 
unilateral restrictions on the public’s enjoyment of, and participation 
in, the creation of ideal speech situations. Because copyrighted 
materials are embodiments of multiple dialogical transactions and are 
fundamental for cultural discourse and social and personal change, the 
lack of balance between owners and users destabilizes the basic 
structure of the copyright system. One of the immediate consequences 
 
436 JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 42–
53 (2008). 
437 Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control, 59 OCTOBER 3, 4 (1992). 
438 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOMS 26 (2006). 
439 JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE 
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 188–89 (2012). 
440 Id. at 202. 
441 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Truth and Society: The Discursive Redemption of Factual 
Claims to Validity, in ON THE PRAGMATICS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION: PRELIMINARY 
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 85, 97–103 (Barbara Fultner 
trans., 2001). 
442 ANDREW EDGAR, HABERMAS: THE KEY CONCEPTS 65 (2002). 
443 Id. 
444 Id. 
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of this imbalance is the ease by which users are labeled pirates, 
citizens of an “infringing nation,”445 or members of a violent gang.446 
This is especially worrisome in an age that values participation and 
sharing and constantly reinvents channels for interaction and the 
exchange of information. 
The fundamentality of the protection of networks’ social role as 
conduits of information is evident in many ways. For example, it is 
evidenced by the failed legislative attempts of Congress to impose 
more stringent enforcement of laws against online piracy447 and by 
the emergence of alternative models of creative production and 
distribution.448 It is similarly reflected when search engines escape 
civil liability for copyright infringement by facilitating access to 
online content and providing “a significant benefit to the public.”449 
Recently, a district court justified Google’s endeavor, Google Books, 
which enabled users to find information quickly and easily, stating 
that the book access Google provides benefits authors as well, as it 
“increas[es] their audiences.”450 Despite all this, media and Internet 
giants have persuaded Congress to pass a multitude of new laws 
criminalizing copyright infringement on the Internet451 and have filed 
endless lawsuits against people who have posted copyrighted 
materials online.452 These giants have also introduced privately 
governed systems, like the Copyright Alert System (“CAS,” or “six 
strikes”)453 and other arrangements, that make the digital culture one 
of fear of being sued,454 as well as a culture that supports “the 
emergence of architectures of control.”455 
 
445 JOHN TERHANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU (2011). 
446 BOON, supra note 49, at 101–02. 
447 See HACKING POLITICS: HOW GEEKS, PROGRESSIVES, THE TEA PARTY, GAMERS, 
ANARCHISTS, AND SUITS TEAMED UP TO DEFEAT SOPA AND SAVE THE INTERNET (David 
Moon et al. eds., 2013). 
448 See LESSIG, supra note 430, at 277–79 (discussing the culture of Creative 
Commons). 
449 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). 
450 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
451 See 17 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1)(B) (2012) (criminalizing willful infringement without 
requiring financial gain). 
452 Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 483 
(2015). 
453 See CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMATIONAL, What is a Copyright Alert? (2014), 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/what-is-a-copyright-alert/ 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2016). 
454 See LESSIG, supra note 207. 
455 COHEN, supra note 439, at 187. 
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As in every system built around concepts of production and 
ownership, limitations on access to networked resources are 
legitimate and necessary to create normative boundaries of what is 
and is not permitted.456 In imposing such limitations, however, 
Congress should refrain from constantly introducing new “regimes of 
authorization,”457 which are socially undesirable and only perpetuate 
the copyright divide. Control regimes affect our ability “to transform 
ourselves and our environment.”458 They affect the ability of 
individuals to dialogically transact knowledge and information. For 
this reason, we should focus our attention not only on how to enforce 
rights, but also on how users experience the accessibility of 
information networks and resources. Only then should we design 
relevant laws. Attention to users is fundamental, given the recent 
proliferation of tools for direct social interaction and informational 
exchange between individuals, groups, and collectives.459 These tools 
include the rapid development of new multifaceted technologies such 
as wikis, peer-to-peer file-transfer protocols, social networking 
facilities, 3D printing, and the augmentation and replacement of pre-
millennial Internet media. These tools will have powerful 
implications for legal systems by creating a vibrant, interconnected 
Web 2.0 environment; they will also influence the inner construction 
of individuals’ selves,460 further reflecting the broad affinity for the 
self as dialogical. 
According to a prevalent psychological theory, the self is engaged 
in a constant process of active positioning. Exposure to information 
and contribution to dialogical exchanges in cyberspace “make 
possible a far broader engagement in constructing personal identity as 
a ‘society’ of mind.”461 As Vincent Hevern observed, “the rise of 
 
456 For example, there are copyrighted works, such as big-budget movies, that need 
strong intellectual property laws, otherwise they could not be produced. Lemley, supra 
note 452, at 496. 
457 COHEN, supra note 439. 
458 BOON, supra note 49, at 104. 
459 COHEN, supra note 439, at 187. 
460 HUBERT HERMANS & AGNIESZKA HERMANS-KONOPKA, DIALOGICAL SELF 
THEORY: POSITIONING AND COUNTER-POSITIONING IN A GLOBALIZING SOCIETY 1 (2010) 
(“In a world society that is increasingly interconnected and intensely involved in historical 
changes, dialogical relationships are required not only between individuals, groups and 
cultures, but also within the self of one and the same individual.”). 
461 Vincent W. Hevern, Dialogicality and the Internet, in HANDBOOK OF DIALOGICAL 
SELF THEORY 185, 189 (Hubert J. M. Hermans & Thorsten Gieser eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2012) [hereinafter Hevern, Dialogicality]; see also Vincent W. Hevern, Threaded 
Identity in Cyberspace: Weblogs and Positioning in the Dialogical Self, 4 IDENTITY: INT’L 
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social networking tools such as Facebook or MySpace and their 
integration into other online presentation utilities continues to give 
selves the means of expressing valued and quite varied positions with 
ease.”462 Users’ active roles in cyberspace contribute immensely to 
this process. Users do not merely buy a newspaper or watch a 
program on television “but actively contribute to self-definition by 
posting messages, uploading visual and sound productions (to 
YouTube, Flicker, etc.), and engaging others in extended 
conversations in chat rooms or comment threads, and similarly active 
processes.”463 The nature of this process is collaborative. This 
collaboration provides creative individuals like authors with the 
properties necessary for meaning-making and challenges concepts 
like authorial individuality and ownership because imprints of 
information produced by the imaginary other are evident in authors’ 
creative expressions.464 
From the processes taking place in information networks emerged 
the “networked self.”465 To flourish,466 the networked self requires 
“access to resources and . . . the availability of a sufficient variety of 
real opportunities.”467 Control regimes change these opportunities 
and create different networked selves.468 
The laws of these regimes, in addition to the strategies employed 
by private players, stifle two carnivalesque spaces—one public and 
one private. First, they reintroduce and apply feudal principles to 
networks. Authors and artists, corporate players, and other owners of 
cultural objects have replaced the Church and institutions of the 
feudal system. They have become the centers of cultural power that 
control the way in which meaning evolves.469 Second, they limit 
individuals’ ability to transform themselves, to develop their 
 
J. THEORY & RES. 321 (2004) [hereinafter Hevern, Threaded] (showing how weblogs 
illustrate processes of cultural exchange and how authors of weblogs construct their 
identities online and negotiate internal positions in these processes). 
462 Hevern, Dialogicality, supra note 461. 
463 Id. at 190. 
464 Jeremy Phillips, Authorship, Ownership, Wikiship: Copyright in the 21st Century, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 193, 203–04 (Estelle Derclaye 
ed., 2009) (noting that in digital environments there cannot be one particular owner of 
information; there must be multiple owners). 
465 COHEN, supra note 439. 
466 Id. at 223. 
467 Id. at 216. 
468 Id. at 217 (providing that “the networked self in the age of authorization is a 
different self”). 
469 See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
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personalities. A human self requires exposure: it must remain an open 
construct and continuously remodel itself.470 As Herman and Gieser 
put it, “internal dialogues within the self and external dialogues with 
actual others are both needed in order to reach a cross-fertilization of 
the mini-society of the self and the macro-society at large.”471 
Intellectual property laws were created in a world of scarcity. They 
were designed to artificially replicate scarcity in places where it could 
not subsist. These laws now target public goods that would otherwise 
be available for all uses and users and artificially restrict their 
distribution. They create a false scarcity in order to render owners’ 
benefits excludable.472 The Internet challenged artificial scarcity by 
making information “no longer scarce”473 and by introducing the 
democratization of content distribution. Legal systems responded with 
laws designed to overregulate access to information and combat 
online piracy. The scarcity problems will likely become even more 
complex as we reach a post-scarcity age in which ideas become even 
more abundant. In such an age, intellectual property laws will be 
forced to respond to the challenges brought about by new 
technologies and find ways to re-introduce false scarcity in order to 
protect the rights of authors and inventors.474 New laws may further 
restrict informational carnivals that digital networks permit. 
Therefore, as Mark Lemley recently observed, “we should resist the 
tendency to expand IP reflexively to meet every new technological 
challenge.”475 
In the early days of the Internet, the Supreme Court declared, “the 
strength of the Internet is chaos [and] the strength of our liberty 
depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech”476 
on the Internet. This chaos defines the value of information networks. 
 
470 N. KATHERINE HAYLES, HOW WE BECAME POSTHUMAN: VIRTUAL BODIES IN 
CYBERNETICS, LITERATURE AND INFORMATICS (1999) (coining the term “posthuman” as 
a definition of the transformative human self in light of human-machine relations). 
471 HUBERT J.M. HERMANS & THORSTEN GIESER, Introductory chapter, in HANDBOOK 
OF DIALOGICAL SELF THEORY, supra note 461, at 1, 18. 
472 J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 46 (1996) (“[S]ociety’s laws have been 
extended to include those trespassory rules which create artificial scarcity in unpublished 
and published ideas . . . .”). 
473 Lemley, supra note 452, at 469–71 (explaining how the Internet changed things). 
474 See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Indistinguishable from Magic: A Wizard’s guide to 
Copyright 3D Printing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 683, 696 (2014) (claiming that new 
technologies will force inventors and authors to “confront exactly the same enforcement 
challenges” their predecessors had to face when, for example, Napster was launched). 
475 Lemley, supra note 452, at 507. 
476 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
ZEMER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  10:19 AM 
2016] Dialogical Transactions 221 
It feeds carnivalesque opportunities bereft of official constraints. 
Networks and new technologies may survive some legislative 
attempts to curtail this chaos, but not all. The effect of these attempts 
on the development of dialogical spaces and dialogical selves will be 
vast. Just as illegal graffiti painting will continue even if space is 
provided for legal graffiti (“since disobedience is a major motive for 
many painters,”477) users of information networks will continue to 
confront intellectual property laws, declaring their freedom to use 
information without the consent of rightholders. 
Consequently, the networked environment will be affected by 
legislative attempts—perhaps in vain—to curtail users’ disobedience 
in ways that may severely disturb the freedom to dialogically transact 
with others. Users in this situation will increasingly become 
“habituated to processes of authorization.”478 This may deepen the 
copyright divide between owners and users, further restricting sites 
for public engagement and stifling the “becoming” nature of authorial 
and artistic selves. 
CONCLUSION 
Dialogue is a basic need in contemporary culture. Absent 
dialogicality—whether with fellow individuals or the collective and 
its symbols—the author will become an “isolated being,” 
“ungraspable,”479 “the topical man.”480 This Article did not attempt 
to dissolve “the self in the collective dynamics of social 
processes.”481 Instead, this Article argued that parallel to common 
conceptions of authors or artists as autonomous, self-contained 
individuals, distinct and separate from their environment, the nature 
of copyrighted materials as dialogical transactions requires shifting 
conceptions of the ownership of creative content and meaning–
making. For a copyrightable work to emerge, an author requires 
conversations and ideas, but to consolidate, to become an expression 
worthy of protection, the author needs intensive social interaction—a 
deeper involvement of the other, whose footsteps can be traced when 
engaging with a text or interpreting a work. 
 
477 Watzlawik, supra note 387, at 412. 
478 COHEN, supra note 439, at 202. 
479 NIKULIN, supra note 23, at XI. 
480 Locke, Of Study, supra note 290. 
481 Anna Stetsenko & Igor M. Arievitch, The Self in Cultural-Historical Activity 
Theory, 14 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 475, 479 (2004). 
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Dialogue theory must address how to reconcile the older and 
fundamental split of society with the individual. Dialogue, as a 
genuine conversation, reflects progressive communicative 
achievements that have become a fundamental characteristic in a 
cultural and networked life that values participation over singularity. 
The logic of dialogue is to maintain a fair play between the dialogue’s 
participants. Copyright laws should strive to provide “rules of 
dialogue that allow for ‘fair play’ by distributing power in a 
reasonably equitable way . . . .”482 Though intellectual property laws 
presuppose the presence of intensive communicative relations in the 
creative process, they deny the fact that personal existence “creates a 
demand within one to relate oneself to the world in ever new ways 
and not always with reference to a given meaning-structure.”483 
The philosophy of dialogue abounds with dormant potentialities 
that have been actualized across a broad spectrum of fields484 but 
largely taken for granted in legal discourses. A theory of dialogue for 
copyright is needed—one that helps to decenter and make more fluid 
the monological self that copyright laws celebrate. Such a theory 
emphasizes an emergent and relational reality, values a multiform 
truth that can only result from real conversation, and enacts a 
profound respect for difference and otherness. A theory of copyright 
as a dialogical transaction tells us that the story we were told—of the 
author as a lone creator who creates ex nihilo—is better told as the 
story of the others who use their voices to interrupt the loneliness of 
the person who wants to become an author. 
 
 
482 Douglas N. Walton, New Directions in the Logic of Dialogue, 63 SYNTHESE 259, 
273 (1985). 
483 Biswas, supra note 98, at 225. 
484 Cissna & Anderson, supra note 234, at 65–66 (surveying fields other than law 
where the theory of dialogue was applied). 
